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ABSTRACT 
The thesis in the main, looks at the decision - making process which underlined the Economic 
Community of West African States' attempt to end the Liberian crisis. It examines the establishment 
of ECOMOG to intervene in the Liberian civil crisis and the various pacific attempts to resolve the 
Liberian question. It does so through the medium of decision - making theory and some of the 
conceptual models that have flowed out of it. The thesis' focus on the decisional process of a 
regional body marks an attempt to broaden the scope of application of decision - making paradigms, 
which are usually employed to analyse decisions of national governments. The imperative for 
analysing the decisional process of ECOWAS in its quest to find solution to the Liberian problem 
has in part been dictated by the novelty of the ECOMOG concept. It marks the first major attempt 
of a sub - regional economic organization to successfully find solution to a civil conflict, as a result, 
there are numerous lessons to be gleaned from its failures and successes. Its relevance in the African 
context, with its intractable conflicts cannot be overemphasized. It has also been motivated by the 
fact that more works need to be produced on the decision - making processes of governments and 
regional bodies within the continent. 
The thesis argues that, both rational and "irrational" elements infused the decisional process of 
ECOW AS in its bid to solve the Liberian Crisis. Among other things, Policy - makers were 
influenced in their choice of decision by rational calculations based on national interest. It examines 
the clash of interests which characterized the establishment ofECOMOG as an tntervention force, 
the impasse this fostered and how it was eventually resolved. It postulates that exteljIlal actors 
influenced the decision process and that policy :Qiakers were aided to make the decisions they made 
by other organs in the decisional chain. The "irrational" component of the process, among other 
things, could be seen from the fact that the Liberian question was solved in " bits and pieces". 
Besides, blunders were committed through defective decision - making mechanism. The thesis 
concludes by offering suggestions to improve the quality of ECOW AS decision - making process 
with regard to conflict resolution and how to achieve regional consensus. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has been inspired by the fact that it has now become imperative, given the scant 
attention consigned to the decision - making process in Mrica hitherto, for more work to be 
undertaken with regard to the process of policy formulation on the continent (Korany, 1987: 
40). The thesis will seek, by its emphasis on a regional body, to broaden the scope of 
application of the established decision-making paradigms beyond the state level. This has 
been motivated in part by the fact that regionalism is a resurgent phenomenon around the 
globe and in Mrica in particular. As a result the decision-making processes that are 
associated with such bodies have assumed enormous importance and therefore deserve close 
scrutiny. 
The Liberian conflict could be spoken of as a reaction against almost a decade of Samuel 
Doe's authoritarian corrupt leadership and his ruthless dealings against any internal dissent. 
Through the system of patronage, he periodically used his state power to gain the loyalty and 
support of some sections of the society. One convenient yet harmful way of doing this was 
to provide them with public service employment. Between 1980 - 1985 he increased public 
service expenditure by a whooping 300%. Personnel salaries made up 74% of government 
budgetary spending. In the 80's as much as U.S $300 million accounted for patronage pay -
offs (Reno, 1998:85). Funds for such payments came from public corpor~tions, which as 
a result undermined their viability. During his almost a decade in power, export @arnings 
declined. For example, exports of rubber,.iron -ore and timber declined from 484 million 
dollars to 362 million in 1983 (ibid:87) In response to the spate of corruption within the Doe 
cabal, the U.S Government sent a task force of financial experts to audit the government 
accounts and uncovered massive embezzlement of state funds by officials who included 
members of his known administration. He used the Liberian Petroleum Refinery to acquire 
subsidized oil imports which he later sold at cut throat prices (West Africa, 27 July 1987, 
1430 - 1431). 
With the spate of corruption,..weak revenue base and dissipated state coffers, the country lost 
)ts capacity to honour its debts to financial houses such as the Mrican Development Bank 
With the spate of corruption, weak revenue base and dissipated state coffers, the country lost 
its capacity to honour its debts to financial houses such as the Mrican Development Bank: 
and the International Monetary Fund. They subsequently withdrew aid to the government. 
It was aggravated by the withdrawal of U. S grants to Liberia in 1988, because of misuse of 
such aid. 
The nation was indeed in crisis, there was widespread feeling of discontent and 
disillusionment; unemployment was on the ascendancy as more and more people flocked to 
the city of Monrovia in search of jobs. Doe alienated large sections of the society, by filling 
the national army with members of his own Kran tribe from Grand Gedeh. He alienated his 
political allies through his unbridled passion to hang on to power and the political class by 
excluding them from active political life. This was much in evident when he banned 
comparatively more influential political parties from contesting in the 1985 elections, which 
he decided to contest, irrespective of the internal and external pressure against the decision 
(Reno, 1998, Tarr, 1993:74; and Dunn, 1998). J'hus the culture of alienation which dates 
back to the settler days lingered on during Doe's tenure. The only difference was that this 
time the perpetrator was an "Mrican" and the victims were both natives and people of 
settler descent. The discontent created by such stifling climate -found expression in 
successive unsuccessful coups d'etat to be followed by brutal persecution of opponents. He 
conducted reprisals against the clansmen of Qiuwonkpa of Nimba county, as a result of 
Qiuwonkpa's unsuccessful coup against the Doe regime. The reprisals culminated in the 
\ 
massacre of about 5 000 people (Dunn, 1998). 
I 
The institutionalization of violence and the general insecurities which it brought drove 
political leaders from different political orientation into exile. They came to be united by 
a passion, to remove Doe from power. As it became neither possible to unseat him through 
the ballot box nor through coup d'etat, a consensus coalesced around insurgency as the only 
viable option to chip away progressively, the bases of his power and finally bring him down. 
Thus, on the eve of Christmas 1989, Charles Taylor who was a fugitive from justice, began 
an insurgency against Doe's government from Nimba county which borders on Cote d' Ivoire 
(Brelis, 1990; Reno, 1998:92). The insurrection degenerated into fratricidal war fare. Doe 
-was purported to have massacred about 600 men, women and children of Nimba origin on 
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one Sunday in a chapel (Vogt, 1991). Krans, people from the Gio and Mano tribes became 
targets of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. Other nationals from the sub - region 
resident in Liberia were trapped in the conflict and there were reports of nationals like 
Nigerians being singled out for murder by Taylor's men on the pretext that Babangida, the 
President of Nigeria was supporting Samuel Doe. The Liberian crisis was proving to be a 
humanitarian disaster as a result of the carnage and social dislocation caused by the civil 
war. 
It coincided with a period in which much of the world's attention was focussed on the Gulf 
Crisis in 1990. It came at a time in which there was growing Western disinterestedness in 
the affairs of Africa, she was being marginalised in part because of the newly found interest 
in Eastern Europe, which had come out of communism. She was no longer of any strategic 
importance especially with the demise of the "Cold War" (Clapham, 1996). At the time of 
the crisis, there was the widespread belief that the United States was going to intervene 
primarily because of the historical links between the two entities. There was the feeling that 
Liberia was after all an American creation and therefore had a responsibility towards the 
country. For example, the then Italian Ambassador to Liberia echoed this sentiment when 
he declared that it was an American responsibility to intervene in the Liberian crisis. 
However, the truth of the matter was that there was a systematic U.S disengagement from 
the country dating back to 1985, in part because of the gross mismanagement and corruption 
in "high places" and the misuse of U.S. financial aid. By 1989, the pthcess had been 
completed, it stopped giving financial aid to the country and most U.S firms had left~ In fact 
Doe was no longer a useful ally to the U.s, this was in sharp contrast to the Cold War era 
when regardless of corruption and lack of democratic credentials the U.S. continued to 
support him in appreciation for his anti - Libya and anti-communist rhetoric. It has been 
noted that throughout the 80's he received a total financial package of 500 million dollars 
from the United States in appreciation for his loyalty (Chege, 1992: 146 - 63; Clapham, 
1996 and Dunn, 1998: 84). 
The disinterestedness in the-Liberian crisis could be inferred from what the U.S Under 
_Secretary had to say about opportunity lost: "I believe that we missed an opportunity in 
Liberia ... A modest U.S. intervention at that point (April- May, 1990) to end the fighting 
in Monrovia could have avoided the prolonged conflict that Liberia had enjoyed until the 
present "(Cohen in Dunn, 1998:84). It was even more explicit in the remarks by a U.S State 
official: "It is not our role to intervene, to engage in peace - keeping or to impose a 
government or political system in Liberia" (Tarr, 1998: 160). The symbolic representation 
of U.S disinterestedness in Liberia occurred in June 1990. She deployed 2,100 marines on 
four ships off the coast of Monrovia and contrary to the expectations of Liberians and the 
international community about U.S eventual intervention, a few marines disembarked to 
evacuate U.S. nationals and watched on dispassionately as the drama of carnage unfolded 
(Dunn, 1991 : 84). 
Therefore in the midst of the international apathy towards Liberia and the death and 
destruction, ethnic blood -letting rampant all over Liberia as a consequence of the escalation 
of the war into inter-ethnic massacres and the loss oflives of sub-regional foreign nationals, 
the Economic Community of West Mrica Cease - Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was 
formed. The regional body had to step into the vacuum to bring sanity into the war tom 
country. ECOMOG is therefore a novelty, it marks the beginning of a meaningful regional 
attempt outside the frame work of the Organization of Mrican Unity (O.A.U) to eventually 
broker peace between antogonists in a civil conflict. This observation is captured by the 
following lines: "The uniqueness of ECOMOG is predicated on the terms and nature of its 
genesis. It was established as the instrument of a policy which arose from th~ first genuinely 
collective initiative of a sub-regional economic organization in Africa" (WestA/ried 23 - 29, 
August, 1993.p. 1488). 
However the formation of ECOMOG also brought to the fore the perennial antipathy 
between the Anglo - phone bloc of states and the Franco - phone bloc of states within the 
sub - region. It also revealed the hand of extra- Mrican interest in the Liberia saga. In all 
not less than 13 accords were signed in an effort to resolve the crisis. Which in itself give 
a clue of the complexity of the Liberian imbroglio. 
In the main, the thesis seeks1:o explore what informed the decision process, the reasons for 
- its successes and failures. Magyar underscores the importance of ECOMOG when he 
asserts: "We believe the ECOMOG's activity with respect to Liberia is an event that merits 
close examination as there are numerous lessons to be learned from this experience which 
may inform the historian, analyst and the policy maker... " (Magyar, 1998 : 173). Indeed one 
of the lessons which could be gleaned from ECOW AS experience in Liberia is that it takes 
diplomacy to build the necessary consensus needed to resolve conflicts stoked by conflicts 
of interest (Ayam, 1998 : 105). The lessons to be drawn from ECOMOG's experience have 
assumed much prominence especially in the light of the regional insecurities and intractable 
conflicts that have plagued the continent. 
Again, as was pointed out earlier on, external actors had influence on the process of policy 
formulation, the thesis will therefore explore the nature of such influences and how they 
impinged on the quality of the decisions made. France, the United States and the United 
Nations all in varied ways helped shape the decisions taken by the sub - regional leaders with 
regard to the Liberian question (Tarr, 1998, Reno, 1998). Such interest in external 
influences would serve to broaden the scope of decision - making paradigms which tend to 
be silent on such influences. Undoubtedly such influences are unavoidable in the third world 
and in particular Mrica as a result of their dependency status which have therefore rendered 
the state's boundaries highly permeable (Brecher, 1977). 
The thesis seeks to capture the essence, in all its nuances, decision - making and 
implementation process which undergirded the formation of ECOMO<V and all other 
attempts at the sub - regional level to bring peace to Liberia. It does so through the use of 
the various assumptions of decision - making theory and some of the works which have 
flowed out of them, namely that of Allison (1969 and 1971) Janis (1972) and Steinbruner 
(1974). This path has been chosen to, among other things, ascertain the level to which 
"rationalism" and "irrationalism" inform the decisions of policy - makers at the regional 
level; to ascertain why there were failures and successes and to what extent the general 
assumptions of decision - making theory help explicate the decision - makers choice to 
establish ECOMOG. The study, among other things, subjects the decision to establish 
ECOMOG to three levels of -analysis. It uses the rational actor model, the Governmental or 
_Bureaucratic and Organizational process Models of decision - making to analyze the 
decision to set up ECOMOG. This in a sense reflects Allison's work of 1969 and 1971 in 
which he subjects the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962 to three conceptual levels of analysis. 
Chapter Two examines the various works upon which the thesis is based, that is, the broad 
frame work of decision -making theory. The object of this is to provide the foundation upon 
which the discourse in the other chapters rests. Chapter Three utilizes the rational actor and 
bureaucratic concepts of decision- making to analyse the decision to establish ECOMOG, 
and its operations. The motivation for this has been largely drawn from the works of Allison 
(1969 and 1971) and decisional assumptions from the works of such scholars as Simon 
(1968) and Braybrooke and Lindbloom (1963). Organizational Process Model of decision 
making seeks to establish that contrary to the conventional wisdom that decision-making 
process is entirely within the domain of national leaders, organizational outputs play vital 
role in the process. In fact, Allison (1969 and 1971) postulates that organizational outputs 
state or define the problem which confront the leaders, set the constraints or parameters 
within which leaders make their choices and provide the input for implementation of those 
choices. It is argued that owing to the great variety and complexity which sometimes inhere 
in issues, the omniscient quality that rationalists invest on policy-makers which give them 
the ability to have a full grasp of any issue at a given time and make a rational choice is 
unrealistic (Braybrooke and Lindbloom, 1963:71-79). Rather, decisions made are based on 
limited information which is available to them at any given time. One of the things that 
happen therefore is that errors are committed and rectified upon receipt of new information. 
In essence, organizational behavior of sequential attendance to problems, amorfg other 
orgamizational characteristics, may also seem to underline decisional behavior of leaders. 
Could it be that the many accords that were signed are symptomatic of this? 
In the light of the controversy that initially surrounded the formation of ECOMOG some of 
the sub-regional leaders arguing against the procedure upon which ECOMOG was erected, 
Chapter five examines the character of the decisional group which met to set up the 
intervention force. It seeks to test the assumptions embodied in the work of Janis (1972) 
which, inter alia, postulates that a decisional group with a high degree of camaraderie and 
_ who share same ideology may "hijack" the decisional process to serve their own ends. He 
argues that such a process may be faulty because of the existence of a "group think" 
syndrome. He lists as among the tendencies of this group their inability to seek external 
consultation on the issue at stake: their unwillingness to accept opinions or views which do 
not corroborate their intended line of action; their false conception of the operational milieu 
and a sense of "invincibility." 
The second half of Chapter Five examines the reasons for the successes achieved in the 
effort to resolve the Liberian impasse. It seeks to do so by ascertaining the degree to which 
the characteristics Janis asserts are the counterpoise to faulty decision-making process were 
prevalent in the decisional processes which accounted for those successes. Chapter six 
evaluates the various findings of the study of the decisional process and provides 
recommendations based on them. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SETTING THE SCENE - A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK 
This chapter discusses the various concepts of decision - making theory and some of the 
models that have flowed out of them. David Easton provides a working definition of 
decision thus: "They are the out puts of the political system by which values are 
authoritatively allocated within a society" Doughel1y and Pfaltzgrapf (1971) indicate that 
decision - making, in the context of the state, is the art of examining possible alternatives 
to the redress of a given national problem. It is therefore one of the salient aspects of state -
craft. This is particularly true in the light of the fact that decisional outcomes impinge either 
positively or negatively on the lives of governments and individuals both nationally and 
internationally. A careful survey of the variou~ assumptions of decision - making theory, 
which have evolved over the years reveals two basic dynamics upon which the theory hangs, 
the rational and the irrationaL 
Rational Actor 
, 
Echoing the view of one of the modem exponents of political realism, Hans Morgenthau, 
J 
Decision - Making theory posits that an element of rationalism infuses the decision - making 
process of government. That the hand of prudence guides the statesman to choose from a 
menu of alternatives an option with a high premium. The rational decision - maker rejects 
options on basis of costs and benefits calculations and settles for the option which is low on 
cost but high on utility value, defined as the national interest (Allison, 1969 and 1971, 
Morgenthau, 1967 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971, Steinbruner,1982, Kissinger, 1957 and 
Scheling, 1962). Exponents of realism assert that the interest of the statesman is co - terminus 
with the interest of the state he represents. Hegel writes: " It is one of our basic methodological 
choices to define the state as its official decision makers, tho~ whose authoritarian acts are to 
10 
all intents and purposes the acts of the state. State action is an action taken by those acting in 
the name of the state" (Hegel in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971:315 ). The statesmen is 
deemed a rational actor, in the sense that in any given problem that confronts his national 
society, he ascertains what the facts are and their implications for national security and 
survival. The choices or the actions taken are the rational acts necessary to ensure the interests, 
security, protection and survival of the state. Morgenthau states that: " ... all nations are 
compelled to protect their physical, political and cultural identity against encroachment by 
other nations." (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971: 76). 
Realists believe that unlike the state level where there is a centralized authority which imposes 
order and control through its laws and effective sanction mechanisms in case of violations, on 
the international level, there is no such overarching authority to impose order. This is in part 
because each state is a sovereign entity not subject to any external law. As a result, there is 
anarchy on the international plane. Therefore in the quest for survival, one of the options 
available to the state is the acquisition of power. Power is sought by states as both a means 
and an end. It takes power, which at one level, may be defined as military might,to combat any 
threat to the security and survival of the state. States will therefore lise force to further their 
national interests. Again, in this world of anarchy, acquisition of power becomes a guarantee 
against external aggression. 
J 
Realists like Morgenthau argues that this element of rationalism in the decisions of statesmen 
is what lends continuity and similarity in foreign policies of nations. Thus regardless of who 
is in charge of the affairs of the state, choices that are made are guided by rational calculations 
defined as national interest. In pursuit of the national interest, it is argued that the state or the 
statesman is guided by a morality different from that of the individual. In essence the adage: 
"The end justifies the means" is applicable here. The morality of the decisions or the acts of 
state is determined by its national interest. This would lead Morgenthau to instruct that acts 
of statesmen or political act's" must be judged by rational criteria. 
11 
The Multiplicity of Players in the Decisional Game. 
Besides the classic concept of a unitary decision - maker who decides in the interest of the 
state, it has been discovered that in any deliberation of policy decision, there are multiplicity 
of actors, who form coalitions and counter - coalitions and represent different interests and 
constituencies (Allison, 1969 and 1971, Riker, 1962; Truman, 1951; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf 
1971). Therefore in any given issue, there may be diverse interests, which produce group 
conflicts. It asserts that the decisional unit comprises actors who represent various departments 
and" constituencies" such as defence, foreign Affairs and Treasury. It includes secretaries and 
advisors or the members of cabinet. Political parties and pressure or civil groups may influence 
the policy formulation process. In every policy deliberation process the players have different 
policy preferences. The players possess varied degrees of bargaining skills, knowledge and 
power potentials, which they enlist in their bid to secure the adoption of their preference. What 
emerges after much "pulling and hauling" as the policy choice is based on compromise 
(Allison, 1969, ... Destler, 1972: 14 - 20). Spanier (1987:544) puts it thus:" ... what emerges 
as the policy choice ... is the outcome of the political process, the government actions resulting 
from all the arguments, the building of coalitions and counter - coalitions and the decision by 
high officials and compromise among them ... ". The adage: "where you sit indicates where 
you stand" assumes much prominence in such a decisional process. For instance, in any policy 
deliberation that touches on security, it is likely to find the defence team o\,ting for a military 
action. Among other things, if the military industrial complex is not a myth, a miliJary action 
would enable the military establishment to give contracts to their clients, manufacturers of 
military hardware. 
The Decisional Unit 
Decision - making theory focuses, in decisional analysis on the small group of decision -
makers rather than the state. Especially if one understands that the choices are made by 
individuals acting on behalf of the state. This helps to concretise the locus of political analysis. 
As a result it is no longer what the state did which is of relevance but what the decision -
makers did (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971 :315 - 316). As a result the decisional behaviour 
of decision - makers who craft governmental policies have assumed much prominence in 
decision - making analysis. It has been accepted that the psychic complexes of the policy 
maker are relevant in the policy formulation process. His past experiences, education, 
childhood, beliefs, values and images shape the content of his decision (Synder et.al., 1963; 
Singer, 1963; Patchen 1965; Walker, 1977; Rosati, 1978). For example, it has been noted that 
the psychological content of the mind of the decision - maker may form a perception or a 
shadow of what exists in actuality. Brecher states: " Decision - makers act in accordance with 
their perception of reality not in response to reality itself (Brecher, 1972: 11 - 12). This 
dichotomy between the psychological milieu of the decision - maker and the operational milieu, 
what exists as the reality in the world out there, in part accounts for policy failures or flawed 
decisions. 
Values and past experiences of policy makers impinge on the quality \of their decisions. 
Values may be societal acquired, in other words certain societal norms and values oyertime get 
deeply ingrained in the psyche of the decision-maker, which invariably influence his decisions 
(Frankel, 1963). It may also be personal convictions acquired through experiences or 
associations. During the deliberations on the "Cuban Missile Crisis" one of the options which 
was on offer was a "surprise attack or invasion of Cuba." The advocates of this option 
reasoned that this would give them the opportunity to correct the botched effort at Bay of Pigs. 
Robert Kennedy was however of a different opinion. He saw in a surprise attack as a negation 
of American value, which frowned upon such an action on an enemy. He equated this with the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Marbour. If this hurt the world and most especially Americans' 
-. - sensibility, it was bound to be the same if that option was-adopted. Tojo, who· ordered the 
attack was seen as a villain, and since no one, especially the President, wanted to be seen as a 
villain, that option was dropped. 
Decisional Conflict 
The decision - making theory posits that decisional conflict may inhere in the decision making 
process. Janis defines it as the opposing tendencies within an individual which interfere with 
the formulation, acceptance or execution of a decision. It may stem either from the 
psychological personality of the individual or pressures from competing groups or both (Janis, 
1972). He posits that members of a cohesive group tend to suppress their personal doubts, or 
self - censor whatever misgiving they may have concerning a group decision. This may be due 
to a desire not to break the homogeneity of the decisional unit or atmosphere. The group that 
presided over the 'Water - Gate" scandal exhibited self - censorship. President Richard Nixon 
acknowledges it in his memoir: "Looking back vn it now I can see that we were all operating 
from different basis of knowledge and with different perceptions of our own vulnerabilities. 
These different perceptions and the chasm they created in our overall understanding are 
apparent now ... " (Ibid: 226). 
Sometimes members undergo self censorship rather than to express their misgivings for fear 
of coming under pressure from others. Schlesinger gave voice to his feeliqgs after the Bay of 
Pigs" debacle thus: "In the months after the "Bay of Pigs" I bitterly reproached JIlyself for 
having kept so silent during those crucial qiscussions in the cabinet room, though my feelings 
of guilt were tempered by the knowledge that a course of an objection would have 
accomplished little save to gain me a name as a nuisance. I can only explain my failure to do 
more than raise a few timid questions by reporting that one's impulse to blow the whistle on 
this nonsense was simply unwelcomed by the circumstances of the discussion" (Schelesinger 
in Janis, 1972:39). There could also be direct pressure on dissenters to conform. Robert 
Kennedy was purported to have once told Schlesinger during the pre - Bay of Pigs days after 
the latter had given him his.opinions that: "You may be right or you may be wrong, but the 
_ President has made his mind up. Don't push any further, now is the time for everyone to help 
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him all they can" (Ibid.: 40). Decisional theory acknowledges that the decision - taker makes 
his decision within a total perceived environment which includes his national political 
environment and the international system as a whole (Frankel, 1963). Though decision -
making on the national plane is confined to the level of political leadership, activities of other 
forces within the domestic environment to a certain degree impinge on the nature of the 
decisions which are taken. In contemporary times public opinion polls have come to be 
cherished by national leaders as is evident in the popularity of opinion polls on both national 
and international issues. Public opinion is of much significance even in authoritarian societies 
(Korany, 1987). Hume underscores the important of such opinions in his assertion: "It is on 
opinion only that government is founded: and this maxim extends to the most despotic and 
most military governments as well as to the most free and most popular (Hume, 1875:110). 
Domestic Context 
External actors in the domestic context who may influence policy decisions may include the 
opposition parties (in democratic societies), the mass media, the intellectuals or the tiny critical 
sector of the society and interest groups on specific issue areas. For example, one would expect 
the labour union to considerably influence government's trade and labour policies. Such groups 
may at times mobilise public opinion to influence policy decisions. This is much in evidence 
in the third world where political institutions tend to be at the rudimentary stage or where 
\ 
political institutions tend to be less vibrant. It is common to find the intellectual class, 
I 
especially the student body forming a coal!tion with both skilled and unskilled urban workers 
and other sections of the populace to influence policy decisions (Frankel, 1963: Almond and 
Verba: 1963: Korany,1987:55, Holsti, 1967). 
However, in most cases statesmen or policy framers shape public opinion in line with their 
own perceptions, or accept opinions which strengthen their own perceptions. In international 
affairs this is made possible in part because of the widespread ignorance or apathy of most 
members of the society to international issues. Whatever knowledge they may have on a 
_ particular issue may be based on official information, which contains some element of bias. 
Sometimes the element of bias can be very strong, what Plato refers to as "one magnificent lie" 
(Frankel, 1963: 75; Holsti, 1967). President Nixon captures the essence of the assumption thus: 
tIlt is the responsibility of the leader to lead public opinion, not just to follow. The leader must 
get all the facts before making a decision and then must develop support for that decision 
among the people by making the facts known to them" (Nixon in The Manchester Guardian, 
29 September, 1958). Gathering facts to develop support for decisions reveals an important 
aspect of the decision - making process. That decision makers attach great importance to 
reasons they give to their actions. In the policy formulation process, decision - makers are 
preoccupied with the reasons to be assigned to their contemplated action. Questions like what 
would the public say; what would other nations say; what will other decision - makers say are 
given great attention. 
Motive Statements 
The motives of policy makers have therefore become a very relevant focus of analysis. Motive 
statements may not always be a reflection of real motive. However, 'such motive statements 
may in time influence the behaviour of the proponents, motive statements may also influence 
the behaviour of other actors. Decision - makers sometimes couch their motives in sentiments, 
values and norms shared by either the cultural milieu in which they form an\integral part or the 
international community (Frankel, 1963: l37 - 160). This is necessary, if their dej.:isions are 
to gain legitimacy and acceptability both in the domestic and the international contexts. 
The External Environment 
The external environment also enters into the calculations of policy framers. The salience of 
the external milieu is due in part to the rising trend of internationalisation of factors of 
production, internationalisation of issues like ecology, human rights, the emergence or 
resurgence of regionalism. This has meant that in any given issue there is a commonality of 
both local and international interests and such interests invariably affect or impinge on the 
decision - making process. As Rosecrance points out, the fate of states is more interwoven now 
than ever before, especially due to economic factors (Rosecrance, 1990). Regionalism has also 
meant that national entities have had to harmonise their interests with that of their regional 
partners, which includes consultations on a regional level (Snyder et. AI., 1963). The 
commonality of interests has also necessitated the encroachment of regional partners in the 
affairs of member states when the need arises. 
In the Third World, and especially in Africa the previous incidence of colonialism has created 
a pattern of underdevelopment. This has in part been brought about by the peripheralization 
of the continent which dates back to the colonial times. Their economies in most cases are 
adjuncts of the industrial world, reduced to producers of raw materials, with comparatively 
lower returns, and buyers of finished products. The resultant inequalities of income, and the 
underdevelopment which flows from it has meant that they continue to behold onto the 
\ 
industrialised nations and the former colonial masters. They continue to depend on their 
i 
largess (Caporaso, 1978; Amin, 1977: Brecher, 1977: Adedeji, 1996). This dependency status 
has rendered the states boundaries highly permeable, in the sense that the states no longer have 
absolute control over decisions, therefore the decision - making process is heavily encroached 
on by external actors. 
Antithesis of the Rational Actor Concept 
Works of such scholars as Simon (1968): Braybrook and Linblooom, (1963:71-79) and 
Steinbruner (1982) offer challenge to the classic model of rational decision - making, which 
emphasizes that the decision - maker spreads out before him all his available alternatives, 
measure them in terms of cost and benefits in order to arrive at an option with a maximum 
utility value is simply unrealistic. They argue that the decisional process bring along its own 
complexities. Again, the basis of their challenge rests on the assumption that the constraints 
of time, limitations of man's problem solving capacities, the limitation of information available 
and the cost of analysis (in terms of personnel, resources and time) make the assumption of the 
classic model improbable. In place of the maximization concept, they substitute the notion of 
satisficing behaviour, which presupposes that policy -makers examine alternatives sequentially 
until they stumble upon one which meets their minimum standards of acceptability. In 
essence, they keep rejecting unsatisfactory solutions until they can find one which they can 
agree is sufficiently satisfactory to enable them to act (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1971). By 
inference therefore, decision- makers do not assign payoff values to option or engage in 
advance calculations of options. These observations have come out of the study of 
organizational behaviour in which Cyert and March (1963) and Cyert and Simon (1968) 
establish that in solving problems Organizations do not integrate value calculations in their 
decision process. They contend that organizations sequentially attend to problems and that 
decisional outcomes are selected on the basis of accepted standard set by the or~anization. 
They further contend that every organization, for the sake of efficiency and simplicity of 
decisional tasks is split up into sub units. Each sub unit specialises in a given task. This in 
essence, ensures the avoidance of uncertainty in the decision process, as each unit routinely 
applies a set procedure in executing tasks which it has much expertise, kn'owledge and 
competence. By inference, specialization has the effectiveness of circumventing complex 
decisional tasks. 
Out of the assumptions of d~cision - making theory have flowed works of Allison, (1969 and 
_ 1971) and Janis (1972). Allison borrows the rational actor concept, the idea that governmental 
decisions are made from an interplay of preferences from multiple actors and concepts from 
organizational behaviour to analyse the decision - making process of Kennedy's Administration 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962. The Soviet Union installs Missiles in Cuba and 
given the danger it portends for national security, the Administration meets to decide on the 
rational course of action. 
The Rational Actor model 
Using this as a conceptual lens to examine the decision - making process of the Administration 
during the crisis, he postulates that the President as the rational actor, examined a wide range 
of alternatives solution to the problem. After examining the various choices open to him he 
decided on the blockade of Cuban coast, to prevent Soviet shipment of military hardware from 
reaching Cuban shores. This option was chosen with an eye on the security, protection and 
survival of the American nation and its people. ~Jt was seen as more rational and prudential 
than alternatives like surgical air strikes of the missile installation in Cuba or resolving the 
matter diplomatically. For example, it was seen that it was not in the national interest to 
embark on air strikes in the sense that the accuracy of such strikes could not be guaranteed, 
there could be loss of lives, including Russian soldiers stationed at those sites. This may at the 
end provoke nuclear war and thereby jeopardizing the security of the nation. The blockade 
however would afford the U. S the opportunity to gradually escalate confrontation with the 
\ 
soviet union, while ensuring that the proximity of U.S to the confrontation zone and 
I 
preponderance of its power in that hemisphere would give it an edge over the soviets. In the 
end, soviets backed down removing their missiles from Cuba. 
The Bureaucratic Process Model 
With this model, Allison postulates that the decision process was not dominated by a single 
actor, namely the President, examining the pros and cons of the various options before him but 
rather by a multiplicity of ~ctors drawn from both the Kennedy administration and other 
governmental departments. He shows the interests, skills, power, knowledge, the propositions 
and counter - propositions of the various players. For example, Macnamara favoured the "no 
action " option on the grounds that it did not matter where missiles were stationed since it could 
not change the fact that the Soviet Union already possessed the nuclear capability to strike, with 
the same deadly impact from any distance. President Kennedy initially favoured air strikes, 
targeting the missiles sites along with the defence team. Robert Kennedy, Sorensen, and 
Macnamara, who arguably represented much power by virtue of their closeness to the Pre~ident 
skilfully deflated the air strike argument. It was noted that the accuracy of the strikes could not 
be guaranteed, besides if it was carried out it may broaden the theatre of conflict. It was 
reasoned that the Soviet may carry out similar attacks against Berlin or the worse scenario 
would be that it could provoke a nuclear war. In the end the blockade was chosen as the most 
rational and pragmatic option. 
The Organizational Process Model - The Role of Organizational Unit in Decision -
Making 
Allison, (1969 and 1972) borrows from the concepts of organizational behaviour in decision-
making to analyse political decision-making process. In this model of decision-making 
process, he utilises the organizational concepts to analyse the decisions taken during the "Cuban 
Missile Crisis." Commenting on the Organizational process model, he asserts: " ... borrowed 
from the studies of organizations, these loosely formulated propositions ~ount to tendencies 
... In particular instances, tendencies hold more or less ... " (Allison, 1969:698). He <Jsserts that 
organizational outputs, in the main account for policy decisions of government. He further 
postulates that the broad spectrum of problems that confront government at any given time has 
meant that decisional tasks are cut up into segments and parcel out to various organizational 
units on the basis of speciality. Each unit operating in quasi independence, uses its standard 
operating procedure to execute tasks assigned to it. The Zeit motif of this model seems to be 
that in any policy decision process organizational outputs state the problem, provide the 
parameters or boundaries within which solutions or decisions are made and provide the where -
withal for implementation @f decisions taken. In simple terms it means that the decisional 
- choices that leaders make depend greatly on outputs of organizational units. - Theodore 
Sorensen underscores this in his assertion : "Presidents rarely, if ever make decisions 
particularly in foreign affairs in the sense of writing their decisions on a clean state. The basic 
decisions which confine their choices have all been previously made" (Sorensen in Allison, 
1967:699). 
Organizational Outputs 
Allison contends that organizations cherish their autonomous status so much so that they are 
wary of external intrusion into their modus operandi. This presupposes that, at certain times, 
there is bound to be a considerable gap between what leaders choose and what organizational 
unit chooses. However, this is not to suggest that leaders do not have any leverage over 
departmental activities. Kennedy commented on the "intransigence" of the U.S State 
Departments thus: " The State Department is a bowl full of jelly" (Kennedy in Allison, 
1969:699). Applying the concepts he had developed, Allison noted that the decision for the 
blockade was based on organizational intelligence. It was occasioned by photographs of 
missile sites in Cuba taken by the Intelligence unit. Kennedy with reference to this contribution 
of the Intelligence community in his announcement to the American public of missiles sites in 
Cuba and the subsequent decision for the blockade, opined: " I do not think probably we would 
have chosen prudentially as we finally did" (Kennedy in Allison, 1969:704). The discovery 
itself reveals something about organizational routine from the Soviet perspective. Allison 
, 
(1969) contends that analysts from the rational model orientation marvel at the lack of 
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elaborate secrecy concerning the building of missiles in Cuba. For example, it was noted that 
no effort was made to camouflage the building sites. No thought was given to the fact that U.S 
"U2" air reconnaissance flights were likely to photograph such sites. Besides, the missiles were 
built according to the specification in Russia, in spite of the fact that U.S intelligence was fully 
conscious of Russian model and therefore could easily link up such installations with them. 
Organizational process paradigm seems to solve the puzzle. The fact that the sites were not 
camouflaged indicate the notion that they were only carrying out routine exercise. The military 
establishment responsible f~ building such sites never operated clandestinely in Russia, in 
other words camouflaging was not an essential part of its operational code. Again,. they could 
only reproduce the missile system in Russia in Cuba as that was what they had specialised in. 
Organizational behaviour also explains the efficiency with which massive equipment and big 
number of personnel were transported without detection to the sites in Cuba. This task was 
carried out by the Russian Intelligence Service, which arguably has an enviable procedural 
regime built on secrecy (Allison, 1971:114 - 115). 
The process that led to the decision to fly over Cuba to take photographs of the missile sites 
typifies organizational behaviour or procedure. Allison recounts that a C.LA. agent sighted the 
rear profile of a strategic missile on September 12. However, this had to be subjected to the 
procedural regime of the intelligence unit; transmission of such information to Washington 
usually takes between 9-12 days. This is calculated to give enough protection to the agents on 
the field and to reduce the cost of communication. Even though the Intelligence unit had 
information of Soviet shippings to Cuba, information from the Cuban exile community about 
the presence of missile sites in Cuba, report about the boasting of the personal pilot of Fidel 
Castro, that Cuba had acquired an atomic bomb, such information had to be subjected to the 
procedural rig ours of the organization. It first had to be processed to ascertain the accuracy of 
the report. Coupled with the conflict between the C.I.A. and the Air- Force as to whose duty 
it was to fly over Cuba on an intelligence mission, a successful mission could only be 
undertaken on October 14 (Allison, 1969:704). 
\ 
The two options which were highly favoured by the administration were the lesults of 
organizational output, the air strike and t~e blockade. For example, the details for the air 
strikes were according to the specifications of the Air Force or the defence team. What could 
also be gathered from this is that whether there should be air strikes or not depended on the 
capability of that force. It is interesting to note that the air strike option was dropped because 
the defence team could not guarantee more than 90% effectiveness in surgical air strikes. It 
is interesting to recall that the non feasibility of this option could specifically be traced to the 
realisation that the missiles to be targeted in Cuba in case of surgical air strikes were labelled 
as 'mobile I in the sense that they could actually be moved before they become targets of air 
strikes. This revelation and the fact that it helped put on hold that option throws up another 
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essential feature of organizations in the decision - making equation. That one of the variables 
of the constraints within which leaders make their choice is the organizational intelligence 
about (in conflict situations) the capabilities of the enemy. A choice is made if there is 
perceived weakness in the defences and capabilities of the enemy, on the other hand it is put 
on the shelf if organizational intelligence perceives an obstacle, to its successful 
implementation (Ibid,: 706). 
Both the decision to deploy missiles by the Soviet Union in Cuba and the Blockade by U.S. 
reveal organizational outputs. By 1961 the Soviet leadership were worried by the strategic gap 
between the US and the Soviet Union. Whereas U.S. capabilities could target Russian cities 
with ease, Russian missiles were trained only on Europe. This could in part be explained by 
the fact that as at then the military unit responsible for missile production was the ground force 
or the artillery units, which was concerned with artillery rockets, for defence against either 
German or NATO invasion. Hence, the speCialisation in medium range systems like 
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles 
(M.R.B.M.). However, the perceived strategic gap meant that there should be a shift away 
from the preponderant production of those systems to strategic nuclear rockets. A division was 
created within the military establishment for this purpose, the Strategic Rocket Force. 
Manpower and expertise were transferred from the artillery division to the new unit, charged 
with the responsibility of producing Inter - Continental Ballistic Missiles. ilt is significant to 
note that the transfer of personnel in actuality entailed transfer of procedure from 1be old set 
up to the new. The end result was that more of the old systems were produced and less of 
I.C.B.M., the slowness of its production was also due to the fact of budgetary constraints. Thus 
w~J:his "chess board" set the only option open to the leadership to circumvent,the strategic 
gap was to install I.C.B.M. and M.R.B.M in Cuba, to target U.S. 
23 
The decision for the blockade and its implication also reveals organizational output. The navy 
provided the blue print within which that decision was made, and executed the task according 
to its procedural regime. The fact that this decision was really feasible was also due in part to 
the manpower and logistical strength of the navy. In the implementation of the blockade, we 
see the procedural regime of the navy coming into conflict with the desire of the political 
leaders. 
Allison claimed that the President in response to an advice offered by the then British 
Ambassador to Washington instructed that the blockade be moved closer to Cuba. This was 
intended to give Kruschev ample time to reconsider his decision concerning the missiles in 
Cuba. Reliable reports indicated that the blockade line was not moved. It was viewed as an 
encroachment on naval procedure. 
On one occasion, Macnamara being suspicious of the naval operational procedure quizzed the 
chief of naval operations. He asked him: "What would you do if Soviet ship's captain refused 
to answer questions about his cargo ". He picked up the manual of Navy regulations and waved 
it in Macnamara's face and shouted: "it's all in there". Macnamara-replied: "I don't give a 
damn what John Paul Jones would have done; I want to know what you are going to do, now". 
The naval man ended the conversation by stating em phaticall y: "Now, Mr. Secretary if you and 
your deputy will go back to your office the navy will run the blockade" (Allison, 1969:707). 
\ 
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Group - Think - A Defective Decision - Making Process 
In a superb psychological analyses of decisional groups, based on some of the assumptions of 
decision - making theory, Janis ( 1972) lays a foundation for what may constitute a flawed 
decision - making process. In one breath, he shows that policy makers do not always concern 
themselves with calculating the pros and cons of an array of options. They may.limit 
themselves to a few options. He argues that this is highly discernible in a decision group 
affected by what he terms a "group - think" syndrome. He defines it as a group with high sense 
of "camaraderie" which has a uniformed opinion on an issue, regardless of its intellectual 
capacity for divergence of opinion. He lists the following as the essential characteristics 
exhibited by the cohesive decision - making group: Illusion of invulnerability with a high 
degree of risk taking, cohesive with a strong bond of friendship and a common political and 
ideological background, stereotyped notion about the enemy and beliefs about its own morality, 
or shared illusion about the operational milieu and effort to rationalise policy among others 
(Janis, 1972:9-13). He also lists the following as among factors that accounts for defective 
decision - making : lack of norms requiring methodological procedure in decision - making; 
group's discussion limited to a few alternative courses of action, without a survey of a full 
range of alternatives and the costs and benefits in each of them or to examine the preferred 
policy from the standpoint of risks and drawbacks and to provide contingency plan; no attempt 
is made to seek expert advice and the rejection of facts and opinions that po not support the 
initial preferred policy among others (Janis, 1972: 175). ) 
Recipe for Successful Decision - Making 
If the afore mentioned characteristics are responsible for faulty decision then the opposite of 
these contain the recipe for good decision - making process. Janis therefore lists the following 
as amongst the necessary ingredients for a successful policy - making process. A survey of a 
wide variety of options; Critical appraisal of the options on offer; Critical appraisal of the 
- preferred option; Provision for a contingency plan; A preparedness to seek advice from experts 
and other informed groups and institutions and no shared illusion about the enemy (Janis, 
1972: 136). He attributed the successful handling of the "Cuban Missile Crisis" and the success 
of the "Marshal Plan" in part to the presence of these factors. Based on the many ill - fated 
decisions of policy makers; mistakes they do acknowledge, with the knowledge hind sight 
brings; the blinding smoke of camaraderie that sometimes hangs over the heads of decisional 
groups producing consensual short sightedness; the constraints by limited time space within 
which decisions are made, all serve to indicate that such rational assumptions as value 
calculations, appraisal of a host of alternatives in terms of cost and benefit calculations do not 
always enter into the minds of decision - makers. Time, availability of information, the quality 
of the issue at stake, among others, all impinge on the decision process. 
The analyses of decision - making theory have, in the main, revealed that statesmen act or 
decide in the interest of the nation and that the choices they make may be rational choices 
aimed at ensuring the security, protection and_ survival of the nation and the people they 
represent. It has also shown that whereas rational theorists or rationalists believe that the 
decision - maker surveys a wide range of alternative solution to a problem before picking an 
option with an optimum value, other scholars contend that this is unrealistic and that the 
process is marked by sequential attendance to problems. Decision - makers incrementally 
adjust their decisions in the light of new information which hitherto was beyond the reach of 
the decision - makers. The individual decision- maker is important in any decisional analysis, 
\ 
as a result, the decisional group has become the focus of analysis. Thus such psychological 
I 
elements as motives, values, beliefs, inner conflict, images and other factors such as the quest 
for power, the knowledge, skills, ambitions, interests and bargaining potentials as well as the 
external and internal environments of members of a decisional unit have all become necessary 
ingredients in the analysis of the decision process. The analyses have also revealed that 
organizations or various departments indeed playa vital role in the decision - making process. 
Organizational out puts in part account for identification of problems, formulation of decisions 
and implementation. Such revelation obviously retrenches the notion that the policy 
formulation process is excl~ively confined to national leaders. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FORMA TION OF ECOWAS CEASE - FIRE MONITORING GROUP 
This chapter focuses on the process and the dynamics which under-girded the decision to 
establish ECOMOG. It, inter alia, discusses it within the frame- work of decision - making 
theory. With particular reference to the Rational Actor and the Bureaucratic process Models 
of Allison. In this regard, it explores or put into proper perspective the myriad of motives of 
the decision - makers, seen through their national and personal interests and the constituencies 
they represent. It examines the conflict of position, power, knowledge, craftiness and skills, 
ambitions, hopes and fears they bring to bear on the decision process. It· establishes that, 
external actors to some degree encroached on the process and discusses how policy makers 
exploit shared domestic and universal values to win public support for their decisions. 
At the 13th summit of the economic Community of West Mrican States, President Ibrahim 
Babangida of Nigeria floated the idea of a mediation committee to mediate in the on going 
conflict in Liberia and other future conflicts that may crop up within.the sub-region. It was 
unanimously endorsed by member states. As a result of that resolution a mediation committee 
of five members was established comprising Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Togo and the Gambia. 
Membership of this standing committee was to be rotational, each set of members serves for 
\ 
three years (Vogt, 1990: Tarr, 1998; Elwood - Dunn,1998:87). Its immediate task was to 
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secure a cessation of hostilities and an agreement from the warring faction for a peace - keeping 
force to be deployed in Liberia; to ask Samuel Doe to step down, for an interim Government 
of National Unity (IGNV) to be set up which would oversee the election of a new government. 
Armed with this mandate, the Committee held its first meeting in Free Town, Sierra Leone in 
mid July, 1990. Sierra Leone and Guinea were specially invited to join the committee because 
of the effect of the crisis on their respective societies, as a result of their proximity to the 
belligerent nation. At this meeting all the stake holders in the Libelian conflict were invited, 
both civil groups and the armed factions. As it should be exp~cted in such mediatory talks an 
impasse developed especially when Charles Taylor demanded the resignation of Samuel Doe 
and categorically refuse the deployment of a Peace - Keeping force in Liberia. Ostensibly, he 
doubted the impartiality of such a force. 
It was in the face of such intransigence that the committee subsequently decided in August, 
1990 to set up an intervention force, ECOMOG, and the following peace plan: There was to 
be an immediate Cease - fire; the deployment of a cease - fire monitoring group; the 
supervision of the cease - fire by this monitoring group; Doe was to be persuaded to step down 
as President, the setting up of a broad interim government of national unity (IGNU); the leaders 
of the warring faction to be ineligible to head the Interim Government of National Unity 
(IGNU) and the setting up of a committee to organise national elections in which the leaders 
in the IGNU and the warring factions would not be eligible to stand as candidates. At the onset 
therefore, ECOMOG's mandate was to keep peace in Liberia, it was based on the premise that 
there would be cease - fire. However when National Patriotic Front of Liberia went on the 
offensive against ECOMOG on the ground that the Liberian led intervention force was not 
neutral because of the perceived Nigerian Links with Doe, the mandate changed from a Peace -
keeping to Peace - enforcement. Inegbedion comments that: II ••• ECOMOG's operation 
changed from peacekeeping to peacemaking. In other words, ECOMOG would now impose 
a cease - fire. This meant doing battle with the rebel forces, if need be. This formalized the 
current policy of Nigerian Command of ECOMOG" (Inegbedion in Ayam,\ 1998:140). By 
1996 ECOMOG's operations reverted to peacekeeping when all the factions finally istopped 
fighting. The following countries participate9 in ECOMOG at the beginning of its operations: 
Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Gambia. 
--... .,... ~ 
Source of ECOMOG Funds 
At the onset of the operation it was agreed that each contributing country should provides for 
the expenses of its troops. Iweze, the Chief of staff at the initial stage of the operation writes: 
"At the onset of the operation, because of scarcity of funds by ECOW AS Secretariat, the policy 
that was adopted was that each contributing nation should cater for the expenses of her 
contingent (Iweze, 1993:237). It was provided that an emergency fund should be set up for 
ECOMOG operations. The initial capital of the fund was put at U.S $ 50 million from 
voluntary contributions from both the ECOW AS member States and the international 
community. However most of the member states did not honour their commitments to the 
fund, as a result only $3 million was reported to have been collected from participating states. 
It has been reported that the Financial cost to Nigeria of the ECOMOG operations stood at 
between U.S $250 - 500 million (Financial Times of London, June 27, 1991). Nigeria was able 
to fund its operations in ECOMOG as a res,ult of the windfall it received from the sale of 
oil on the world market. As a result of the Gulf crisis, the price of oil temporary shot up. It 
has been estimated that Nigerian earned about $ 5 billion from the sale of oil within the period 
(Ayam, 1998:102). U.S financial aid to ECOMOG increased when it persuaded Senegal to 
participate in ECOMOG. Initially, U.S offered a sum of U.S $2.8million in non-lethal 
assistance to ECOMOG. She provided the sum of U.S $3.75 million to support the 
Yamousoukro peace process. Senegal was given financial incentive, to the tune of U.S $10 
\ 
million for her participation (Mortimer, 1998:127). 
i 
The National Dimension of the Involvement of ECOW AS in Liberia 
The concept of political realism is discernible in the motivations of the major players within 
the Mediation Committee. Therefore Allison's Rational Actor Model can be factored in here. 
The assent to the decision to set up ECOMOG by the individual statesmen who formed the 
Mediation Committee was undoubtedly based on rationalism which could be defined as the 
national interest. Statesmen, as exponents of realism contend, represents the interest of their 
individual nations, thus their interests are synonymous to th~ir individual national interests. 
Morgenthau, argues that statesmen acts rationally by seeking what is best for the nation 
Morgenthau in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf, 1987:76). They are eternally preoccupied with steps 
that will ensure the security and survival of the state in all its ramifications. For example, the 
cultural, physical, political and economic security of the state. 
The Liberian crisis undoubtedly presented a security challenge on the sub-region. Therefore 
the decision to set up ECOMOG could be seen as prudential move, rational in outlook to 
safeguard the security and survival of the various national entities and the sub-region as a 
whole. 
National Interests 
Joseph Momoh, the President of Sierra Leone, and a member of the Committee which met to 
form ECOMOG, must have been motivated by the desire for national survival, in the light of 
the socio - economic and political effects of the ~iberia crisis on Sierra Leone. The influx of 
refugees in Sierra Leone which is geographically contiguous with Liberia created socio -
economic strains on an already weak economy. Momoh highlighted the effect of the refugee 
problem in this assertion: "We are stretching our resources to take care..ofhis (Charles Taylor) 
people. Our social amenities are being over taxed and even our economy has been dislodged" 
(West Africa, November, 1990). By August, 1990, the Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone 
numbered about 20,000 (West Mrica" August, 1990). Momoh must have been worried about 
\ 
this, ostensibly because such strains on the economy and social services if prolonged was bound 
i 
to create disaffection with his government. Economic hardships and coup d'etat have always 
been convenient bed fellows. 
Sierra Leone's geographical contiguity with Liberia must have provided an additional source 
of worry for him and the impetus for deciding in favour of ECOMOG. He must have 
reasoned that the spirit of insurgency may easily be transported into Sierra Leone.Sierra 
Leoneans had been identified in the ranks of N.P.F.L, it was therefore an unspoken fear that 
once Charles Taylor succeeds in establishing himself as the head of the Liberian state, it will 
motivate such elements to begin their own insurrection move1l!ents against Momoh~s regime. 
This fear would become a reality when Fodeh Sankoh, in 1991 began a rebel movement against 
his regime (Conteh - Morgan, 1998:l47;Reno, 1998:123). And it was the ineffectiveness of 
his regime to flush out the movement that would in part lead to his overthrow by the "Young 
Turks" led by Captain Valentine Strasser (Inegbedion, 1994:228-229). He must have therefore 
fallen under the conviction that supporting a decision for a regional intervention force and 
providing troops for it would help secure his own survival, the stability of his country and the 
region as a whole for economic development. 
Lansana Conte of Guinea must have been attracted to the decision for almost the same reason 
as Joseph Momoh. Guinea is geographically contiguous with Liberia. It is reported that 
Guinea and Sierra Leone had the largest number of refugees (West Africa, 1990). He must have 
also been influenced by religious and tribal considerations. Charles Taylor was purported to 
have carried out systematic killing of members of the Gio and Mano tribes of Liberia, who 
belonged to the Mandingo stock, a linguistic grQup largely based in Guinea. Because, they 
were accused of collaborating with the Doe regime. Besides, there were Guinean elements in 
Charles Taylor's N.P.F.L He had a taste of the political danger to his survival when Charles 
Taylor earlier on in the conflict, in July, 1990 made a brief incursion .into Guinea (Conteh -
Morgan, 1998:147,Elwood - Dunn, 1998:87). 
Reason for Ghanaian Support 
I 
Jerry Rawlings, the President of Ghana and the Intelligence community of Ghana had 
developed a close relationship with the Liberian exile political community in Ghana who were 
against the unbridled ambition of Taylor. He was once incarcerated in Ghana after he escaped 
from U.S prison in Boston as he was facing extradition order. Apparently he waS not in the 
good books of Rawlings. His interest in the Liberian situation must have been motivated by 
the plight of the sizeable Ghanaian community trapped in Liberia. It was also reported that 
there were some Ghanaians fighting for the N.P.F.L. (Tarr, 1993). Report had it that such 
elements have the potential of destabilising the regime once they were through with the 
Liberian situation. 
Gambia 
Sir Dawda Jawara, the President of Gambia and the Chairman of ECOW AS authority at the 
time the decision to intervene was taken was motivated by national and regional security 
concerns. There were reports of Gambians and other West Mrican dissidents fighting 
alongside the N.P.F.L. 
Nigeria 
The key actor and the driving force behind the decision was arguably Babangida. Earlier on 
he had called for the establishment of a Standing Mediation Committee during the ECOW AS 
13 th summit in Banjul, on 6th July, 1990 to mediate in the conflict in Liberia and any other 
future conflict that may rear its head anywhere in the sub - region (Vogt, 1991, Mrica Insight, 
1993). His interest on the surface seemed to have been motivated by the national interest of 
his country,which among other things have been defined in the shape of three concentric 
circles. It stipulates that the national interest of Nigeria converges with that of her immediate 
neighbours and the sub - region as a whole. The protection of the people of Nigeria and its 
territorial integrity and sovereignty is co - terminus with that of her immediate neighbours and 
\ 
the sub -region (Adisa, 1993;Vogt, 1991;News Watch, 1990,West Africa 1990). During a 
i 
presentation at a Nigerian Army Chief of Staff he declared that Nigeria's participation in 
ECOMOG was dictated by Nigeria's foreign policy which had been evolved over the past three 
decades (May, 1998:112). 
Thus Babangida's interest and sensitivity to the Liberian crisis must have been predicated on 
the notion that an instability in that country jeopardises the security of the region and by 
extension that of Nigeria in both political and economic terms. He asserted that, in apparent 
reference to situation in Lib~ria,: "When certain events occur in the sub - region ... which are 
bound to affect Nigeria's politico - military and socio - economic environment, we should not 
stand by as helpless and hapless spectators" (WestAfrica, 26 November - 2 December, 1990). 
Obviously an unstable regional environment militates against a healthy climate needed for 
regional development and integration, which is the linch pin of ECOW AS. Nigeria without 
doubt stands to gain immensely from this, given the size of her economy and the immensity 
of the volume of her economic activities in the sub - region. Thus the economic down turn 
which may flow out of political upheaval anywhere within the sub - region may be bound to 
be immense and catastrophic for Nigeria. Vogt (1991) gives a glimpse of the economic 
implication for Nigeria as a result of the on going strife in Liberia. She recounts that the 
Managing Director of Cadbury, Nigeria limited (a beverage enterprise) lamented that the 
company had lost about NlO million ( about a quarter of a million dollars) in export proceeds 
since the inception of the war. Now, one begins to appreciate the concern when you add up 
the loss of that company to the losses of other Nigerian businesses in Liberia. 
There was also the humanitarian and the factor of Nigerians being singled out for murder by 
N.P.F.L. forces. When Charles Taylor began his insurgency, Nigeria had about 70,000 of her 
nationals in Liberia. They became targets of N.P.F.L attacks. Taylor at one stage held about 
200 Nigerians hostage and threatened their lives. It was reported ~hat on 8 August 1990, 
N.P.F.L. fighters forcefully entered the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia, where about 2,000 
nationals had taken refuge. After looting the place, they were reported to have killed between 
700 - 1,000 of the Nigerian refugees. In reference to the incident, Babaginda on 11 August 
1990, declared: "If the harassment of Nigerians by troops of Charles Tay16r continues, what 
will follow will be another matter" (May, 1998:111) The assault on the embass/itself is a 
violation of the sovereignty and territorial 'integrity of Nigeria. Embassies are considered in 
internatonallaw as extensions of national territories. By extension therefore, the assault on the 
embassy could be deemed as a violation of one of the core principles of Nigerian national 
interest and foreign policy. In fact, Babangida justified Nigeria's involvement in ECOMOG 
as a defence of Nigeria's territorial integrity (May, 1998:110). It could therefore be stated that 
from the rational point of view Babangida' s decision reflects the national interests of Nigeria 
as enshrined in her foreign policy objectives. The event in Liberia threatened these interests. 
~ 
The lives of her nationals were in danger, her sovereignty and territorial integrity was being 
violated, the politico - economic stability of the sub - region was under threat. Rationalism 
dictates that force need to be applied to safeguard these interests. 
Close Relations Between Nigeria and Liberia 
The advent of Babangida' s regime witnessed a close relationship between Nigeria and Liberia. 
The Nigerian Government was noted to have funded and helped staff the Graduate School of 
International relations of Liberia. Nigerian lecturers and professors were known to have taught 
there. Doe once enrolled at the institute. Doe was reported to have named the high way 
linking Liberia to Sierra Leone after Babangida upon completion of the project (May, 
1998: 113). The Lagos Guardian reported that Doe was presented with the highest award of 
Nigeria when he visited with Babangida. The title the " Grand Commander of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria" was conferred on him. The paper lamented that, Nelson Mandela who 
was comparatively of a higher international stature received a lesser award when he visited 
(The Guardian of Lagos, June 1990:11). When Liberia was put on the black list of both the 
International Monetary Fund and the African Development Bank for failing to honour her 
debt, the Nigerian government helped reschedule the loans the country _owed to A.D.B. Itmade 
a contribution of about 4.5 million U. S dollars towards the rescheduling (Africa Event, January, 
1995:39; May, 1998:113). Ayam (1998:98) contends that: "The epitome of the closeness 
between Doe's Liberia and Nigeria emerged at the start of the insurrection launched by Charles 
Taylor. Doe was in Nigeria in April 1990 on a solidarity visit after Babahgida survived an 
attempted coup d' etat but also ostensibly to request for weapons needed by the Liberian Armed 
Forces to fight the NPFL". Therefore the decision must have been motivated to save an ally 
of Nigeria. Ayam testifies that the Standing Mediation Committee was faced with the problem 
of divergence of interests. In the case of Nigeria the main issue was its closeness to the Doe 
regime (Ayam, 1998:98). There was therefore the assumption that ECOMOG was conceived 
to save Doe. Critics contended that at the time of deployment there was in actuality no cease 
- fire in place. Charles Taylor had vowed to shoot at the force if they dare land in Monrovia. 
The argument was that since the factions were still fighting the only option for ECOMOG 
-
would be to interpose itself between the belligerents to enforce peace which would obviously 
entail some fighting on the part of ECOMOG. It was therefore seen as an intervention force 
calculated to deprive Charles Taylor of his ultimate prize, the presidency, and to bale out the 
tottering Doe. 
Selfish Motives 
Critics see the decision as a shrewd move by Babangida. The Liberia crisis came at a time 
when his popularity and moral credibility was at an all time low due to his prevarification with 
regard to his commitment to return the country to civilian rule. The Liberian quagmire may 
have presented him with a golden opportunity to divert minds away from the domestic scene. 
It would give him the opportunity to hang onto the reins of power once Nigeria became 
involved, he could used that as a pretext to stay on. (Adisa, 1993: 148 - 149 ). 
Again, they viewed his motive as selfish especiafly when placed against the fact that the cost 
of intervention to the Nigerian economy and the people was bound to be enormous. It occurred 
at the back drop of severe economic hardships as a result of the government decision to 
implement the I.M.F. economic reform package. The nation was reelil!g under the effect of the 
social cost ofthe economic adjustment. The reform stipulated, among other things, less public 
expenditure, retrenchment and diverstititure of state enterprises. They wondered why he would 
rather use the windfall created by the oil glut as a result of the Gulf Crises to finance operations 
in Liberia rather than using it to ameliorate the social cost of structural adjristment ( Nigerian 
I 
Tribune, 15 August, 1990 ). That, this was a national concern could be seen in the position 
of Nigerian Labour Movement on 20th A~gust, 1990: "We scarcely need to emphasise that 
Nigeria's involvement in the mediation will no doubt place on us enormous economic and 
political responsibilities at a time when hands should be on deck to help tum our crisis - ridden 
economy towards healthy growth" (The Tribune, 15 August, 1990). However, from the realist 
perspective Babangida' s decision, inspite of the mounting criticisms has a morality of its own. 
Regardless of what his personal motives must have been it was also calculated with national 
interest in mind. In this regard the sacrifices that the nation had to make was worthwhile. 
Collective Interest 
The desire to maintain the status quo within the region undoubtedly informed their decision. 
There was a common aversion to the precedent which was being set by the insurgency of 
Charles Taylor. It was felt that if it was unchecked, it could spill over to areas within the sub 
- region. It was indeed the fIrst time that there had been an insurrection led by a civilian, 
against an autocratic regime. In fact it threatened the very foundation of the status quo, when 
viewed from the perspective that most of the leaders had the same dictatorial credentials as 
Samuel Doe. This is reinforced by the assertion that: " ... there was general consensus that 
Taylor's virus must be stopped before it contaminates the whole of the West Africa sub -
region (New Africa, October, 1992: 16). The Guinean President, Lansana Conteh puts it in 
perspective : " Charles Taylor is a bad example. Civilians should not be encouraged to 
overthrow military regimes. Again, Sir Dawda Jawara, the then President of Gambia, gives 
voice to the implication of the insurrection to regional security in the following statement : " 
... If Charles Taylor with the support of what I may call mercenaries from other countries of 
the sub - region were to come to power by force, one can imagine the implication it will have 
for sub - regional security ... " ( West Africa, 28 November - 2 December, 1990 ). Babangida 
reechoed this fear when he alleged, in apparent reference to Liberia, that crisis or conflict in 
any West African State may have dangerous spill over effect on the peace and quiet of Nigeria 
(May, 1998 ). In the end force was applied, as ECOMOG mandate changed fr~m peacekeeping 
to peace enforcement, in the face of NPFL intransigence to accept a cease - fIre. The iI}dividual 
nations saw this as the only rational option to guarantee their national and collective regional 
security and interest. 
The Bureaucratic Process Model and the Regional dimension of ECOW AS in Liberia: 
The process leading up to the decision to set up ECOMOG, and the controversies it generated 
share some affinities with bureaucratic politics as expounded by Allison. Actors built 
coalitions, skilfully outmanoeu!red others to put forth their preferences, there were arguments 
and counter arguments in a bid to put forth their preferences 
Skilfulness in Decision - Making 
Critics argue that Babangida must have planned it all from the beginning. He knew what he 
wanted and masterfully schemed to achieve it, out manoeuvring in the process his opponents. 
It shows the skills and knowledge that decision - makers bring to the decision - making 
process. He was fully conscious of the procedural regime of ECOW AS and exploited it to his 
advantage. As a result, opponents charged him of having personal interest in the entire 
Liberian saga. When he made his suggestion for the establishment of a standing mediation 
committee, he added that one of the members of the mediation committee should be a member 
who held the chairmanship of the Authority. He suggested this with the fullest knowledge that 
it was shortly to be passed on to Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia, and as chair of the Authority 
he had the mandate to call up a meeting and giv.e his consent to whatever decision made. He 
must have reasoned that it would be easy to secure the consent of Jawara who also had a vested 
interest in the conflict. Earlier on he had intimated his desire to see the carnage in Liberia 
brought to a halt. 
The suggestion for the establishment of a Mediation Committee, was endorsed by all the 
\ 
members of ECOW AS, including the known supporters and sympathisers of Charles Taylor, 
J 
Blaise Campo are of Burkina Paso and Houphouet Boigny of Cote d' Ivoire. These two 
statesmen may have lent their support for the mediatory concept on the assumption that by the 
time the curtain was finally closed on the "mediatory charade" Charles Taylor must have "shot" 
his way to the "Executive Mansion". They must have known that such talks are always stalled 
or come to a halt as a result of irreconcilable differences among stake holders in conflict, and 
would always get the opportunity to oppose the deployment of an intervention force, once 
peace talks failed, whenever it was introduced on the summit floor of ECOW AS. The script 
however turned out to be different. Babangida manipulating the procedural regime of the 
organization managed to secure the decision to deploy a f~rce in Liberia. Campoare, out -
manoeuvred, surprised, disappointed, frustrated and angry burst out: " We learned from the 
international media, the momentous decision by some member states of ECOW AS to send a 
supposedly reconciliatory force to Liberia and without flfst fully briefing other countries on 
the exact assignment of the force. As far as we are concerned the Mediation Committee of 
ECOW AS is not competent to intervene in a member state's internal conflict" (West Africa, 22-
28 July 1991). 
The Anglophone Coalition 
A look at the composition of the Standing Mediation Committee reveals a powerful coalition 
of Anglophone members, compromising, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Ibrahim Babangida of 
Nigeria, Sir Dawda Jawara of Gambia, and Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone. This coalition was 
boosted in strength by Lansana Conteh of Guin~a, who shared the interest of the coalition to 
send in an intervention force to stop Charles Taylor. The other two Francophone members of 
the group,namely the representative from Mali and Eyadema of Togo were undoubtedly unable 
to match the resolve of the coalition to send in the intervention force r~gardless of the fact that 
there had not been any cease - fire in place. For example, the representative from Mali was 
on record to have resented to the deployment of a force, arguing that there must flfst be a cease 
- fire. Eyadema, was purported to have expressed his misgivings and unhappiness of the: " 
\ 
Free wheeling role the mediation cabal had adopted" (West Africa 3 - 9 September, 1990). 
J 
Francophone Position 
On the other hand such positions undoubtedly reveal the perennial cleavage between 
Anglophones, namely Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Gambia (Former British colonies) 
and Francophones, among this group are Cote d' Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Benin 
and Togo (former French colonies) which have always dogged the decision - making and 
implementation process of ~e sub - regional body, ECOW AS. This is in part because of the 
different positions and interests each group represent on any given issue. The interest being 
represented by their positions, a case of Francophone solidarity, may extend beyond those of 
Campoare and Houphouet Boigny to include those of France. Both of them were active 
backers of Charles Taylor. Burkina Faso was used as a base for military training of N.P.F. L 
soldiers and served as a conduit for arms and armament from Libya. 
Family considerations, regional ambitions and external influence may have accounted for their 
opposition to the decision. Campoare is married to Houphouet Boigny's step - daughter who 
was the wife of Adolphus Tolbert, son of President Tolbert both killed by Doe. The crisis 
therefore afforded both Campoare and Houphouet, united by marital links, an opportunity to 
avenge the killing of their late family members by Doe (Vogt, 1991, Reno, 1998). Their 
opposition in essence reveals what Conteh - Morgan (1998) refers to as "co operational 
insecurity". A concept which is akin to "Games Theory" which inter alia stipulates that 
players in international conflict may feel reluct~nt to cooperate, especially if the ""game"at 
hand is not one of " iteration" but rather where outcomes are permanent and unchangeable, 
where a player's gain is another player's loss, a "zero sum game". Reluctance to cooperate 
may also stem from uncertainty with regard to how the gains will be sl)ared, or may stem from 
a situation where cooperation may bring gains less than present one ( Stein, 1983: 115 - 140, 
Axelrod, 1984: 152 - 4, Snidal, 1885- 42). 
I 
Lending support for the peace formula, they may have reasoned, obviously may entail loss for 
Taylor, who may not be able to win the Presidency through the ballot box. He may as a result 
lose whatever he had already achieved. He controlled 90% of Liberia. Non - cooperation was 
therefore attractive as it would offer Charles Taylor the opportunity to mount the final 
onslaught to dislodge Samuel Doe who was holed up in the Executive Mansion. They must 
have felt therefore that the best option was non - cooperation since their protegee was just on 
the threshold of power. As was stated earlier, this logic sound plausible especially in the light 
of the fact that they had initially supported the establishment of the mediation committee with 
the fullest conviction that it would come to nothing. 
Ambitions 
Besides, the decision may have been influenced by the age - old rivalry between Cote d' Ivoire 
and Nigeria now personified by the ambitions of Houphouet Boigny and Babangida for pre-
eminent role in the sub - region. The two nations are arguably the putative heads of the two 
blocs. Houphouet must have been peeved by Babangida's initiative to find solution to the 
Liberian Crisis as an affront to his integrity and authority as the "elder statesman" of the sub 
- continent. He was the one to take the diplomatic initiative to broker peace in Liberia if 
possible on his own terms and not Babangida. That this may not have been far from his 
calculation could be gleaned from the fact that when later Babangida ceded the leading role in 
mediatory efforts to him, this elevated status helped produce four accords in a row, the 
"Yamoussoukro I -IV" (Adisa, 1993). 
External Influence of Francophone Position - A Case of French National Interest 
Again, the Francophone position may have been influenced by the tear of the hegemonistic 
pretensions of Nigeria. Houphouet had always looked with suspicion, whenever Nigeria flexed 
its political muscle to take regional initiatives. He viewed it as an attempt to dominate the 
region. The role of France in the context of the Liberian crisis and the ECOMOG saga 
\ 
provides an instance of extra - African influence on decision - making and implementation 
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process on the sub continent. Thus the decision taken by the representatives of Mali and Togo 
just as it expressed the interest of Blaise Campoare and Houphouet Boigny in essence 
harmoniously articulate that of France. France's relationship with her former colonies, 
especially in West Africa, has been exceptionally close. The colonial links survived after 
independence, through the erection of Neo - colonial " Accords de Defense and Accords de 
Cooperation" Such cooperations manifested themselves in arrangements such as cultural 
cooperation, monetary union, defence pacts, personal relationships and economic and trade ties 
(Ate, 1983, Tarr, 1998: Martin, 1995). 
The importance of this relationship is underscored by the fact that France's Mrican policy falls 
within the exclusive domain of the "Elysee". French presidents from de Gaule to Mitterand 
struck up personal relationships with various Francophone leaders. Houphouet enjoyed special 
relationship with respective French Presidents and was held in high esteem within French 
governmental circles. The cultural relationship that existed between France and the 
Francophone states dates back to the colonial period and found its most visible expression in 
the policy of assimilation. A paternalistic policy which foisted on the Mrican's psyche the 
French way of life. Mricans for example, could aspire to become French citizens and thus 
could sit in the French parliament as deputies. Houphouet, for example became a deputy in the 
French Assembly in the 1950' s. The monetary union which embraces the various Francophone 
states within the sub - region links them up to France with the use of a common currency, the 
franc. The C.F.A the currency commonly used by the Francophone zone was until 1994 
pegged to the French franc at a fixed parity. 
France signed up defence pacts with the various Francophone states that gives French troops 
the right to intervene to shore or prop up incumbent government faced with internal threats. 
It also through technical cooperation offers military assistance and expertise to the states. Such 
defence arrangements culminated in the establishment of Francophone defence zone at the 
behest of France, The Accord de Non - Aggression Et d' Assistance en Matiere de Defence. 
(A.N.A.D). Their economies are tied to the "apron strings of the "Metropole" (France). They 
\ 
are largely suppliers of raw materials and provide markets for French goods and services, 
J 
through such ubiquitous French retail out -lets like Compagnie Francais de L' Ouest (CF AO). 
France until the 1990's offered them direct financial assistance from time to time, it now does 
so through the instrumentality of the International Monetary Fund and the European Economic 
Community. This is indeed a kind of symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, it gives France 
the opportunity to exploit them economically, and by its control over them, a political clout 
in the international arena, an aspiration enshrined in the French policy of " rayonment" 
vigorously pursued by de Gaule and his successors (Ate, 1983; Martin, 1995). For the Mrican 
states, such relationship offers them the security and the economic assistance that they need in 
the sub - region. It could therefore be said that the sets of relationship have produced an 
impregnable bond of common destiny between them, which therefore makes the Francophone 
bloc within the sub - region to identify themselves more and more with France and less and 
less with the sub - region and their Anglophone Mrican brothers. The resultant cultural 
antipathy has been described by Leopold Sedar Senghor as the "spirit offashoda",the colonial 
hang over of Anglophone and Francophone misunderstanding (Adisa, 1993). 
Therefore, given the huge interest of France in the sub - region and the bond between the 
Francophones and France, the preferences of decision - makers from the bloc in any decision 
- making and implementation is tailored to accommodate that of the French. France, has never 
looked on favourably to the hegemonistic potential of Nigeria within the sub - region. This 
obviously strikes at the heart of her own ambition to perpetually dominate the region. 
Successive, French Presidents, de Gaule, Pompidou, Destaing and Mitterand all found 
Nigeria's physical size and economic potential tremendously daunting. The substance of this 
apprehension could be seen, first in her middle power potentiaL According to Shaw ( 1978) 
~'"-
Nigeria belongs to the emerging middle powers rank alongside countries like Brazil, Iran, India 
and Indonesia. A middle power, among other things, has an industrial base, though not on the 
same par as a fully fledged industrialised state or what Wallerstein ( !991) refers to as a core 
state. It has the potential to capture the market, by virtue of its comparatively industrial 
advantage, within the region in which she is situated. Wallerstein ( 1990 ) contends that such 
semi - peripheral states specialise in technological products, which the core states or fully 
fledged industrialised states, specialising in high technological products ar~ no longer keen on 
producing. Nigeria's potential could be seen from the size of its economy. Its gro~s national 
product is 34.2% more than the 14 Francophone states and 29.19% larger than the twenty states 
within the sub - region. It pays 32.8% of the ECOW AS budget larger than any other member 
state, with Cote d'Ivoire only contributing 13% (Inegbedion, 1994: 238). Undoubtedly, if 
carefully nurtured, it could serve as the engine of growth within the sub - region. 
Second, France has sought at different historical junctures to either weaken the hegemonistic 
potential of Nigeria or prevent its realisation. When the Ibos who occupy the eastern section 
of Nigeria embarked on the part of secession between 1967 - 1970, de Gaule andHouphouet 
Boigny recognised the secessionist "state" of Biafra. Eastern Nigeria is rich in oil, thus by 
recognising Biafra, France would not only gain access to the oil wealth of that entity but also 
fragment the territory of Nigeria and remove from her grasp one of the economic pillars of the 
nation. It was therefore a move calculated to weaken her hegemonistic potential. Pompidou in 
cohoot with Houphouet Boigny and Senghor of Senegal initially tried to prevent the idea of 
ECOW AS from becoming a reality. ECOW AS was the brain child of Gowon of Nigeria, with 
the support of Eyadema. Pompidou, Houphouet and Senghor were instrumental in the setting 
up of a parallel Francophone economic zone, the Communaute Economique de L' Afrique de 
L'Ouest, CEAO, in 1973. Earlier on in 1962, de Gaule through his African advisor, Michele 
Foccart, effectively torpedoed the idea of a customs union put forth by President Olympio of 
Togo, which would have embraced Nigeria, Togo, Niger and Dahomey (Benin). Obviously 
they knew, Nigeria was bound, by virtue of its economic might, to dominate the economic 
zone. This may serve to progressively retrench France's economic influence in the region (Ate, 
1983: 24). 
What inspired Mitterand's predecessors to oppose Nigerian propositions in the sub - region 
may have informed his opposition to the formation of ECOMOG. 11 may have been seen as 
an attempt to playa domineering role in the region. Besides, France has always had a special 
interest in Liberia. She has on occasion sought to bring her under the orbit of French influence 
and controL For example, Mitterand in the 80' s invited the then foreign minister of Liberia. 
~ 
Cecil Dennis, to the Foreign Ministers Meeting, in preparation for a Francophone Summit. He 
i 
was at the meeting paraded as a "prize acquisition", this contrasts markedly with the little 
attention he receives whenever he visits Washington (Tarr, 1998:164). Taylor was seen as 
more inclined to tum over Liberia to the Francophone bloc, once he became the president of 
Liberia, this may have been because of his close relationships with Blaise Campaoare and 
Houphouet Boigny. French parastatals established earlier contact with Charles Taylor to have 
access to the resources in the area under his controL French firms like" Sollac" were engaged 
in logging and mining activities in the area under the jurisdiction of Charles Taylor. For 
instance, by 1995, French ~ports of logs stood at 94.4 million cubic metres, emerging as the 
third supplier of logs. From March 1991 French state owned firm "Sollac" bought70,000 tons 
of ore from N.P.FL. on contract basis (Reno, 1998:97, Tarr, 1993). "Le Figaro" asserts that 
: "French private commercial infrastructure support the N.P.F.L and undermined ECOW AS 
by ambushing official Ivorian policy to its own end" (Le Figaro, 8 January, 1992). 
In an interview with West Africa Babangida made a veiled reference to the role of France in 
the Liberian crisis. He stated that when he had an audience with the U.S Assistant Secretary 
for Mrican Mfairs, Herman Cohen, he made an appeal through him to "all those who may 
have influence on either Charles Taylor or two countries we think are providing support for 
him. Mr Mitterand's Advisor was here and we asked him to use his influence on Blaise 
Compoare" (West Africa, 1-7 October,1990). Her interest also accounted for the diplomatic 
support she gave the N.P.F.L at the Security Council. 
Arguments and Counter Arguments 
Frankel (1963) stipulates that decision - makers do not only restrict themselves to formulation 
of decisions but also attach motives which have domestic and international appeal to their 
decisions. Motive statements are couched in language which reflect the values, principles, 
aspirations, morality and sentiments which are up held by the society in which they form an 
integral part. By so doing they mould and shape and eventually win public support for their 
actions. In essence therefore, the motive statement which is dished out serves to cover up the 
\ 
other selfish motives behind decisions taken. Ibrahim Babangida faced with internal and 
J 
external criticism of the decision of the group to send a multilateral peace keeping force to 
Liberia, embarked on a campaign to rally public support for the decision of the group. His 
motive statements appealed to such values as humanitarianism, solidarity, security and such 
sentiments as pride and pan - Mricanism. 
To the legalistic argument mounted by the opponent of the force, especially by the Francphones 
led by Blaise Campoare, that the mediation committee's action was unlawful as it violated the 
O.A.U Charter provision otArtic1e 111-112 which among other things upheld the territorial 
integrity of the state, and other domestic criticisms he responded by soliciting the pride and 
dignity and the humanitarian temper of the African race: 
"Perhaps many do not yet know nor appreciated either the 
danger or the international embarrassment the Liberian crisis 
portends for all of us in this sub - region in particular and to 
Africa and the black race in general. In a changing world 
marching fast into the 21 st century... Weare in Liberia because 
events in that country have led to massive destruction of 
property, the massacre by all the parties of thousands of 
innocent civilians including foreign nationals, women and 
children some of whom had sought sanctuary in churches, 
mosques, diplomatic missions, hospitals and under the red cross 
protection, contrary to all standard of human behaviour" ( West 
Africa, 26 November- 2 December, 1990). 
He reinforced it by affirming that the action was in pursuit of both national and sub - regional 
security interests, as it is expressed by Nigerian [oreign policy objectives: 
There is therefore no gain saying the fact that when certain 
events occur in the sub -region depending upon their magnitude 
which are bound to affect Nigeria's politico-military and socio-
economic environment we should not stand by as a helpless and 
hapless spectator. We believe that if the events are such that 
threaten the stability, peace and security of the sub-region, 
Nigeria and in collaboration with others in this sub-region is 
duty bound to react or respond in appropriate manner necess¥y 
either to avert the disaster or to take adequate measures to 
ensure peace, tranquillity and hannony". (West Africa, 26 
November-2 December, 19QO) 
J 
Such statements undoubtedly help legitimise their action especially in the wider international 
contest. For example, the appeal to military humanitarianism, intervening in a cQuntry where 
in reality there is no effective government, where lawlessness is the order of the day, where 
there is massive loss of human lives and the living only live on borrowed times, international 
humanitarian law pennits intervention (Starke, 1984; Dugard, 1994). An example would be 
the U.N. intervention in Somalia where in place of a central government there were enclaves 
of clan-centred authority. The exploitation of such universal values must have in the end won 
-
_. the sympathy and the support of the international community, as expressed by U.N. and the 
u.s. backing of the ECOMOG concept. Babangida, for example, expressly instructed his 
ambassador to the U.N. Ibrahim Gambari and the Foreign Minister, Riwalnu Lukman to lobby 
vigorously for the ECOMOG position at the U.N. The result must have been the affirmative 
statement of the Security Council that the ECOW AS Plan offers the "best possible framework 
for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian Conflict by creating the necessary conditions for free 
and fair elections" (Inegbedion, 1994: 230 ). 
The survey of the decisional process to intervene in the Liberian crisis by the community of 
West Mrica states reveal that there is the element of "real-politic". National interest is the 
motivational drive behind the decisional preferences of policy-makers. It also reveals the 
antipathy between the Franco-Phone bloc and the Anglophone bloc, the rivalry and the bid for 
pre - eminence, that characterised the decisional process. The chapter has also shown how 
French national interest was served in the ECOMOG saga. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ORGANIZA TIONAL PROCESS MODEL AND ECOMOG 
Allison (1969 and 1971) has shown in his organizational process paradigm of decision -making 
that choices that decision-makers or government leaders make, depend, to an appreciable 
extent, on choices presented to them by organizational units. He postulates that organizational 
outputs and capabilities offer the constraints within which decisions are made and once they 
are made offer the requisite expertise and know how for its implementation. Every government 
decision presents its own complexity, which is however "cut" into pieces and each peace 
parcelled out to different units on the basis of speciality and competence: the standard operating 
procedure (S.O.P) stands it in a good stead to perform the task assigned. This assumption 
therefore presupposes that the absence of such procedures would account for failure or poor 
implementation of assigned tasks. The analyse.s below not only test the afore - mentioned 
assumptions in the decision -making process which undergirded the establishment of 
ECOMOG and the implementation of the task assigned the interventionist force, but also to 
afftrm that organizational behaviour of incremental decision-making',sequential attendance to 
problems, are equally attributes of political decisional units. 
Sequential Solution to the Liberian Question ! 
A survey of the various attempts to find an acceptable peace formula for the Liberian crisis 
reveal the principle of incrementalism and sequential attendance to problem,in decision -
making. Policy makers do make decisions based on existing modus operandi and that at any 
given time the information available to them is limited. The peace formula put in place at the 
first meeting of the Standing Mediation Committee of ECOW AS was a mixture of proposition 
from the Inter -Faith Mediation Council (IFMC), an organization made up of Christian and 
Moslem Clerics as well as prominent citizens of Liberia and a modiftcation of O.A. U standard 
peace plan (Conteh - Morgan, 1993:37). The Inter - Faith Mediation Council at the beginning 
of the conflict, as early as June 1990, attempted to broker peace between Samuel Doe and 
Charles Taylor but failed because of irreconcilable differences between the two parties. Their 
propositions which included immediate Cease-fire, the establishment of an interim government 
of national unity headed by a non partisan person fonned the basis of the peace fonnula. The 
rest of the Peace Plan was a modification of the O.A. U peace plan as was drawn during the 
Chadian crisis in 1980, which saw the nascent of the peace keeping concept in O.AU conflict 
resolution procedure (Klay - Kieh, 1998). 
In essence the process which subsequently led to the decision to intervene mirrors the 
traditional O.AU steps for the resolution of conflict. It sanctions initial effort at pacific 
resolution of conflict through the following media: Conciliation : It promotes the use of a 
facilitator, who will use his "good offices" to get disputants to talk directly to each other 
without the intervention of a third party. On 2ther occasions, depending on the nature of 
conflict, the O.AU will mandate Heads of State who are not party to the conflict to peacefully 
resolve the conflict. Usually the mediators listen to the various stake holders to the conflict and 
based on the infonnation gleaned from the various positions, establ!sh the condition for the 
pacific resolution of the conflict. At other times, the organization would request the service 
of an imminent person, for example, a head of state to transmit messages to and from each of 
the disputants and in the end provide a rendezvous for peace talks. Or it could be through 
conciliation in which one ofthe organs ofO.AU, for example, the Assembl~ of Heads of State 
) 
or the Council of Ministers would preside over peace talks (Kieh, 1998: 13). 
It is worthy to note that the Mediation Committee followed this procedure, an initial attempt 
at peaceful resolution of the conflict, largely through the mediatory track. The ineffectiveness 
of this method in part was responsible for the adoption of the peace-keeping fonnula. In fact 
it must be mentioned that such standard procedure is enshrined in International Law, which 
stipulates, inter alia, the pacific means of resolving both international and non-international 
armed conflict, however, it allows the use of force through peace-keeping and enforcement 
measures on certain grounds, including humanitarian, as was the case in the Ligerian crisis 
(Dugard, 1996; Starke, 1989). Thus far , the analysis has sought to establish that policy makers 
do follow established procedure as a guide in their decision formulation as exemplified by 
initial pacific methods of the Mediation Committee and the subsequent use of force. 
The organizational pattern of sequential attendance to problems is equally discernible in the 
works of the various summits which hammered out a suitable plan to resolve the Liberian 
debacle. The various decisional groups had to make adjustments on their decisions based on 
the outcomes of previous decisions. Their monitoring mechanism is really restrictive as 
attention is exclusively focussed on feedback produced by previously made decisions. This 
behaviour is really insightful. It does not only negate the omniscient rational policy maker 
paradigm, it indicates interestingly that decision - makers at any given time, given, among 
other things, time constraints and the urgency of a given situation, have limited information 
upon which to form their decisions. 
The decision to set up the interventionist force was in part motivated by the intense conviction 
of the Standing Mediation Committee that the forces on the ground in Liberia were merely "rag 
- tag" that could easily be wiped out in a two hour operation. It was in _fact a wrong calculation 
based upon little or no relevant grasp of the military and economic dynamics of war -lordism 
in Liberia. It never occurred to them until much later that any political arrangement that 
effectively excluded, arguably, the de/acto head of the country, Charles Taylor, who at that 
time controlled about 90% of the country was bound to fail. It took bruising \battles on the field 
for political leaders to build bridges to Charles Taylor. This observation is very much in 
evidence in the earlier accords which attempted to solve the Liberian crisis. Accords such as 
the Bamako Cease- Fire of November 1990, Banjul Joint Statement of December 1990, the 
Lome Agreement of February, 1991 and the Yamousoukro I - IV accords signed in Cote 
d'lvoire between June and October 1991. In the main, these accords had as their referent point, 
the ECOW AS Peace Plan. At Bamako, the participants, namely, the NPFL and the Armed 
Forces of Liberia (AFL) accepted the ECOW AS Peace Plan and agreed to an immediate Cease 
- Fire. Lome provided the modalities for the implementation of the Cease - Fire. ECOMOG 
was given the prime role to ensure the encampment and disarmament of the combatants. Their 
roles included the supervision of the handing in of weapons, the registration of troops, the 
receiving of the sick and the resettlement of the displaced. Yamoussoukro IV established that 
all the modalities for the establishment of the necessary conditions to hold elections should be 
completed within 60 days. It gave central role for its implementation to ECOMOG. Such 
accords revealed the short sightedness of the group which met to craft the various accords. 
They sought to give little or no role to the warring factions in the administration of the country, 
besides, as was evident in the Yamousoukro accords, the principal protagonist in the conflict, 
Charles Taylor's NPFL signed them under duress. The party's heart right at the onset was not 
in the agreement hammered out. Such aversion was compounded by the fact that they gave 
central role in the implementation of the accords to ECOMOG. The accords, for example, 
stipulated that none of the warring factions could head the Interim Government of National 
Unity that was to be set up and that none could participate in the general and Presidential 
elections ( Abiodun 1998). 
The short sightedness of these accords could be seen through the ignorance of the facilitators 
about the complexity of the socio - political and economic character of Liberia in crisis. 
Undoubtedly such exclusions must have been motivated by a desire to discourage the recourse 
to violence to attain political ends. However, it was a decision based on a failure to come to 
grasp with the dynamics of the Liberian society, that war -lordism had become an integral 
feature of the Liberian landscape, and that any peace formula that did not effectively pacify 
\ 
them was bound to fallon the rocks. For an example, Charles Taylor controlled about 90% of 
I 
Liberian territory, he counted on external military assistance as well as considerable income 
from the exploitation of the resources in the vast area under his jurisdiction (Reno, 1998). He 
was therefore better off without a peace formula which did not cede much authority to him. 
Besides, the previous accords suffered a major set back because of lack of credibility of the 
interventionist force (ECOMOG). The major stake - holder in the conflict repeatedly expressed 
his hostility towards ECOMOG. He saw it as Nigerian creation, formed to do the bidding of 
its master ( Nigeria), which was out to deny him his prized goal, the presidency. He on one 
occasion referred to the Nigerian President, Ibrahim Babangida as a " mad dictator". In an 
interview with three foreign reporters in March 1993, he a.sserted that: " ECOMOG is a 
warring party. They have brought genocide to our people. We will talk when Nigeria is out of 
here" (Africa Watch, March, 1993). 
The Cotonou accord which was signed on 25 July 1993 brought together the major stake-
holders in the conflict, namely the representatives of the Interim Government of National Unity 
( IGNU) , the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and ULIMO. This accord has assumed 
enormous significance in the diplomacy to resolve the Liberian civil conflict. It marked the first 
major attempt to rectify the problems thrown up by the earlier accords. All other accords which 
ensued used this as the referent point. It was also the first attempt to " flesh out" the details of 
the peace formula. In this regard, it could be spoken of as building on the previous accords. It 
provided details for the monitoring, supervising and verifying of the cease - fire, encampment, 
disarmament and demobilization and rehabilitation. It gave central role for the implementation 
of the programme to ECOMOG and the UN Observer Mission. It provided details for the 
composition of the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) and its functions, which 
included transitional administration of the country, and supervision of general and presidential 
elections in accordance with the ECOW AS peace plan. It made provision for a Violation of the 
Accord Committee, comprising UN observers, representatives of ECQMOG and one member 
from each of the factions. For the Legislature, it provided that it shall be unicameral Assembly 
of 35 members. The NPFL would have 13 members, Ulimo, 9 and also given the right to 
nominate the speaker from one of its members in the assembly as well as the option to 
nominate two members to the Electoral Commission. It provided that all ~arties to the civil 
I 
conflict shall be given amnesty. They agreed that executive power be vested in a five member 
council, with each of the parties appointing' one member and the remaining two appointed by 
a procedure where each party is given the option to nominate three members who will then 
meet to appoint two members to the council. 
It is clear from the provisions of the accord that it really marked a break with the past. From 
the feedback thrown up by the earlier attempts at resolving the conflict, the group that put 
together the Cotonou accord focussed on the relationships and interests of the armed factions. 
~ 
It presided over a power- sharing regime which took care of the interests of the factions. It 
served to water down the central role of ECOMOG, by diversifying the scope of external 
involvement. This was undoubtedly aimed at appeasing the NPFL. In essence, it acceded to the 
calls to include facilitators outside the sub - region ( Mortimer, 1998; Abiodun,1998). Thus 
the UN and O.AU. participated in the search for the peaceful resolution to the conflict. It, for 
example, made provision for inclusion in the interventionist force, troops from as far afield as 
Uganda and Tanzania. Participants at Cotonou included Professor Canaan Banana representing 
the OAU and the UN represented by Dr. James Jonah. ECOMOG was to work in close 
association with the United Nations Mission in Liberia ( UNOMIL). 
The accord, nonetheless produced problems unforeseen at the time the agreement was reached. 
The 60 days allowed for the implementation of the agreement was, to say the least, unrealistic 
given the enormity of task to be performed by the Interim Government of National Unity, 
ECOMOG and UNOMIL. In the end the programme was derailed by the delay in deployment 
of UNOMIL and ECOMOG to the entire country. The delay had the effect of producing an 
atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust among the various factions which heightened the 
atmosphere of conflict. It made possible the proliferation of new armed factions and the 
resumption of hostilities. The accord failed to specify whether members nominated to the 
council would represent the interest of the various factions or would be independent decision 
- makers. This produced an impasse between nominees and factional leaders, as was the case 
between Thomas Woewuyo and Charles Taylor (Abiodun, 1998). 
J 
The surge in war -lordism, as more factions tried to curve out" enclaves" for themselves must 
have been motivated by a desire to have a political niche to use as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations. Besides, there was the general assumption that the major backers of the warring 
factions, namely Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso for the NPFL and Nigeria, which was claimed 
to have leverage over ULIMO could not exert the required pressure on them needed to keep 
the forces at bay and for them not to renege on their promises to the accord. Unknown to the 
framers of the accord, Houphouet Boigny, for example, no longer wielded any effective control 
over Charles Taylor, he had developed close links with both external and Ivorian businessmen 
and officials who both ensured the supply of arms to Liberia frQm the I vorian side of the border 
and through their business activities with him ensured that he had the where withal to continue 
fighting ( Reno, 1998). 
At Akosombo, a Ghanaian resort town, the actors who met sat down to mend the Cotonou 
accord. It culminated in the signing of the Akosombo accord on 12 September 1994. The 
Armed Forces of Liberia which was a new participant in the armed conflict was given a 
representation in the Interim Government of National Unity to forestall the squabbling between 
the armed factions and their nominees and the civilian members of IGNU, this accord ceded 
effective control of the executive branch to the more powerful factions, namely ULIMO and 
the NPFL. It gave the armed factions the right to determine the status of their appointees in the 
Interim Government through the Council of State. It provided that the Legislature shall give 
consideration to appropriate benefits for the heads of the warring factions. To the protestations 
from the warring factions, especially the NPFL, that too much power was vested in ECOMOG 
at the expense of the Interim Government, th~ accord sought to rectify the anomaly by 
including it in such exercise as monitoring, verifying and observing of the various programmes. 
The accord removed the requirement for consensus decision - making and replaced it with the 
authority of a simple majority which invariably favoured the mor~ powerful factions. To 
forestall the proliferation of armed factions it prohibited and made it an offence for any 
individual to help create other groups including splinter groups. What could be said about this 
prohibition is that the crafters of the accord failed to grapple with the underlining cause of the 
, 
proliferation of armed factions. The cause may be in part due to the political rewards that the 
I 
armed factions have scored in the agreement, which was therefore a huge incentive for the 
emergence of new armed groups. It was also due to the fact that it did not provide effective 
mechanism for the resolution of disputes that may arise out of the appointments to the 
executive branch of the transitional government. 
The Akosombo accord, in an attempt to plug out the loopholes in the preceding one, the 
Cotonou accord, produced an outcome which was less favourable to those who felt sidelined. 
There was indeed a backlash against it, for it yielded too much political clout to the two 
powerful armed factions. For example, they were really ov.er represented in th~ executive 
positions. The civilian sections of the society were really incensed by the degree of recognition 
given to the armed factions, they saw it as retrogressive, unproductive and a misguided attempt 
to reward militancy (Abiodun, 1998; Sessey, 1999). The Akosombo accord produced intra-
factional fighting over allocation of positions. It accounted for the schism within ULIMO, 
which effectively split up into two, ULIMO - K led by Alhaji Kromah, a Mandingo, ULIMO 
- J, led by Roosevelt Johnson from the Kran ethnic group. In essence the pre- eminence given 
to armed factions led to coalitions and counter - coalitions of factions as they jostled for 
positions, newer factions sprang up , as it were, to challenge the provisions of the accord which 
they had not been party to and therefore had little regard for it. Newer factions sprang up such 
as the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), the Lofa Defence Force ( LDF) and an off- shoot of 
NPFL, the CRC - NPFL. Armed hostilities among the various factions resumed on an upswing 
scale, destroying whatever possibility there had been for peace. The Accra Clarification of 21 
December 1994 brought the new groups into the peace process including members of civil 
society. In fact it co - opted this group without a~senting to its concern over the militarization 
of the peace process. The new groups included the Central Revolutionary Council of NPFL, 
who accused Charles Taylor of being a stumbling bloc to peace and disassociated themselves 
from him, the Lofa Defence Force represented by Francois Massaquoi, the Liberian Peace 
Council represented by Saigbe Boley, ULIMO - J by General Roosevelt Johnson and Liberian 
National Conference represented by J.P. Baygar Junius. However, the parties failed to reach 
a consensus on the composition and chairmanship of the Council of State. The AFL and its , 
coalition comprising the five new members on the " block" failed to agree on their joint 
J 
nomination. As a result, a new interim administration could not be put in place in time to 
oversee the implementation of the accord. It must be stated however, that the Accra 
Clarification for the first time, unlike the previous ones specified or clarified what could be 
done to the disarmed combatants. It provided that the combatants and non- combatants who 
satisfied the conditions for recruitment should be included in a reconstituted armed force, 
Police, Immigration and other Security Agencies (Abiodun, 1998). 
In all the previous accords, the heads of the warring factions were outside the Transitional 
government, they were only represented by proxies. This may have in part produced lack of 
total commitment to the provisions of the accords. What the Abuja Agreement of September, 
1995 did was to bring the leaders of the warring factions into the transitional government. 
Charles Taylor of the NPFL, Alhaji Kromah of ULIMO, the coalition represented by George 
Boley and Oscar Quiah of Liberian Peace Council. A professor of Literature,Wilton 
Sankawula, from the University of Liberia was appointed as chairman of the Council of State 
to replace chief Tamba Taylor, an octogenarian, nominated by the powerful factions but 
rejected by the others on the ground that he was old and could not effectively perform his 
duties. In fact, there was a conviction among those who opposed his appointment that the real 
people who would be wielding effective power in the council would be the powerful factions 
represented by Charles Taylor and Alhaji Kromah. To further forestall the squabbling over 
appointments in the Council, all other members were made vice- presidents previously only 
two could be made vice - presidents. In spite of these provisions there were continuous fighting 
within groups like ULIMO. 
Looking at the errors which characterised the many different accords and the very fact that 
there were too many of them, in fact in all as many as 16 agreements were signed, much as it 
must have been due to the intransigence of Charles Taylor, it must have in part due to the fact 
that the various groups who met at different times to craft the different accords never engaged 
in critical appraisal of the issues at stake. Ostensibly each group could only act on limited 
feedback produced by previous decisions. The full picture spelling out the complexity of the 
\ 
situation and how best to deal with them was out of the visual range of each gro~p- It is no 
wonder that problems were dealt with in a sequential mode. This suggest a simplistic decisional 
behaviour which circumvent real thorny issues. For example, one of the causes for the 
protracted nature of the Liberian conflict was that while acceding political power to the armed 
factions, in fact to the factional leaders, no attempt was made to ensure that they accede to the 
military pre - conditions specified in the accords, they continued to jealously guard their 
territorial and commercial resources. 
If such organizational behaviour as expounded above were discernible in the activities of the 
various groups who met to fashion out a peace plan for the c1j.sis, it would be equally true to 
assert that organizational outputs were largely responsible for the fonnulation and 
implementations of the peace fonnula. The Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence put in 
place in 1981 in Freetown, Sierra Leone, by ECOWAS provides that member states or the 
community could intervene either in intra - state or inter- states armed connict where there is 
proof that a third external party is involved in the connict. It then provides that the ECOW AS 
Authority and a defence sub - committee decide, after failure of pacific means to resolve a 
connict, on the expediency of military action and entrusts its execution to an allied force 
commander. Though this protocol was in limbo at the time of the Liberian crisis, the 
committees that were set up corresponded to this provision. The Mediation Committee that was 
set up had a defence sub - committee to assist it (Iweze, 1993). 
Policy Options: Merits and Demerits 
The defence team within the Mediation Committee was given the task of producing the 
specifications and the blue print for intervention. It considered a number of options. The ftrst 
option which was examined by the team would have meant moving into Liberia by land across 
Sierra Leone to the east and moving into Monrovia from the west of ~iberia. However, after 
careful scrutiny of this option it was discarded because of inadequate logistical back up. It did 
not have the requisite transport facilities to move in by road, especially given the nature of the 
road. Besides, the NPFL controlled that part of the country and as there was much uncertainty 
with regard to the reception that would be accorded troops on arrival it' was prudentially 
I 
dropped. The second option was to move in by air and land at the Roberts - Field airport and 
then move west -ward to Monrovia. It was abandoned because it was felt that it will be 
strategically dangerous or unwise to move in by air into a hostile territory. Consensus however, 
coalesced on a third option. It called for an entry by sea. The attractiveness of this option could 
be seen in the following advantages: Two of the factions, the Anned Forces of Liberia, AFL, 
which was supporting the embattled Samuel Doe and a splinter group of NPFL, the INPFL, led 
by Prince Johnson had already agreed to a cease - ftre, both were operative in Monrovia, and 
had received news that Johnson was prepared to receive them once the troops landed in 
Monrovia. In fact when the force did finally arrived in Monrovia, Prince Johnson was on hand 
to welcome them with his body - guards at the Free Port of Monrovia (Iweze, 1993:224). 
The team then provided the blue print for the option, which was organised into phases: 
PHASE 1: A move into FreeTown harbour and loading of the necessary logistics. 
PHASE 2: A move into Monrovia. 
PHASE 3: Landing and breaking out. 
PHASE 4: Reorganising and subsequent move. 
A sub - committee carried out preliminary logistic planning, which included requirement for 
vehicles, equipment, arms and ammunition, drugs and stores, and other aspects like funding, 
control of funds, procurement procedure, equipment schedule, maintenance policy and 
contributions by participating countries (Iweze, 1993). The blue print with the specifications 
and requirements were turned over to the Mediation Committee. Later, with troops and the 
necessary logistical back up already assembled in$ierraLeone, (Ghana Navy had three vessels, 
Nigeria had five vessels including Tug boats and Tankers with Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Gambia and Guinea providing troops) the decision to deploy an interventionist force by sea was 
adopted on 20 August, 1990. 
A few observations need to be made. It emerges from the above account that in conflict 
situations the decisions which are made depend heavily on organizational outputs and , 
capabilities, measured in terms of requisite manpower, logistics, funds and other capabilities. 
Obviously the option which was chosen could not have been possible if there were no requisite 
manpower, logistical back up, naval vessels and the requisite personnel to handle them; and 
most crucial of all if there was no perceived weakness in the enemy defence system. 
The implementation of the task reveals organizational outputs. The immediate task of imposing 
a cease - fire; ensuring the safety of Monrovia and its environs to make possible the evacuation 
of both foreign nationals and locals; and to create an enabling environment for the 
establishment of the Interim Government of National Unity stranded in FreeTown, Sierra 
Leone, in Monrovia. ECOMOG as events unfolded took indep!3ndent decisions and performed 
certain administrative task. It is insightful to note that when the blue print was presented to the 
decision - makers and a question was raised by the defence team as to the next line of action 
once the initial plan had been executed, it was reported that the decision - makers had no clue 
as to what should be done in the event of a reaction from the principal antagonist in the 
conflict, Charles Taylor, who had already vowed to shoot at the forces once they landed at 
Monrovia. I weze who was the Nigerian Chief of Staff of the operation writes: " In the planning 
stage we asked the ECOW AS Secretariat for our anticipated reaction to the leaders of the 
warring factions should we meet them. Unfortunately the leadership could not provide an 
answer, rather we had to manoeuvre as the situation emerged ( Iweze, 1993: 219). This 
revelation indicates that ECOMOG was given a carte blanche to make decisions on the ground. 
On the positive side, it made it possible for some crucial on the spot decisions to be taken while 
on the negative tally, as subsequent events revealed, like decisions at certain stages of the 
conflict to align with some of the factions, for example, with the ULIMO, it deprived 
ECOMOG of its neutral status ( Africa Wat~h, 1993; Magyar, 1998: 182). It was an 
unacknowledged alliance based on the common axiom that" My enemy's enemy is my friend" 
however, it served to heighten the atmosphere of distrust and antagonism which helped to 
prolong the war. 
Fragmentation of Task 
\ 
The actual happenings revealed organizational behaviour, characterised by fragmentation of 
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tasks according to standard military combat procedure. The immediate task on arrival was to 
secure the Free Port harbour to be used as the ECOMOG head - quarters (E.H.D) and certain 
vantage points around the Free Port. The objective was to make it save from the range of 
artillery fire from the NPFL. The military task at hand was shared among> the various 
contingents from the contributing countries. For example, the Ghana battalion had the task of 
securing two bridges on a creek adjacent to the Free Port; the Nigerian battalion was to advance 
from the Free Port area, west and north, to secure a bridge over the St. Paul river; the Guinean 
battalion was to move towards the centre and to secure a bridge on Stockton Creek and to 
capture Garnersville; and the Sierra Leone battalion was to hol9 the break - waters as from the 
outer perimeter defence of the headquarters (I weze, 1993 :223). Whereas the navy carried out 
sea patrols and gave naval gun - ftre support when needed, the Air Force carried out 
reconnaissance missions at the onset and later air strikes on designated military targets. 
At the end of this exercise they proceeded through shared tasks to rid Monrovia and its 
environs of the menace of armed factionalism. ECOMOG managed, at the end of the initial 
operation, to disarm and confine the INPFL and AFL forces to barracks and secured a 
temporary cease - fire from the NPFL on 22 September, 1990. With subsequent reinforcement 
from Nigeria and Ghana, the force made the entire Monrovia safe for the entry of the Interim 
Government of National Unity to begin the task of administering at least Monrovia. It also 
made it possible for the frrst set of refugees numbering about 7,500 to be evacuated and 
managed to stop the slaughter of Krahn and Mandingos in Monrovia. These initial successes 
captured in the expression of a Liberian health worker obviously reflected the sentiments of 
most Liberians : " ECOMOG was our saviour, it was a salvation. ECOMOG saved the 
population of Monrovia ... We feel sorry for them, they have no cause to die here for this stupid 
and senseless war" (Africa Watch, 3 March, 1993). ECOMOG took up some administrative 
tasks, performing policing duties, as the police force had been largely discredited, and settling 
disputes which was outside its peace - keeping mandate ( The Guardian, March, 27, 1993). 
Absence of Standard Operating Procedure 
,I 
In spite of these successes there were flaws in the implementation process. Allison (1969 and 
1971) points out that the " health" of an organization, that is its ability to perform a given task 
to what is deemed by the standard of the organization depends, among other things, on well 
established standard operating procedure, coordination of activities, the existence of relevant 
manpower, expertise and logistics. These are very crucial in the implementation of tasks. There 
was to some extent a dearth of these ingredients in ECOMOG as an organization, which may 
have accounted for the "hiccups" in the implementation process, at the initial stages of its 
operation not- withstanding ~ome of the successes. 
Indeed ECOMOG was an ad-hoc measure, designed to meet an immediate challenge. This 
meant that there was no established standard operating procedure, as it would have been in an 
already established organization, to govern its conduct and activities. For example, there was 
no well defined command structure. This undermined discipline, control and proper 
coordination of activities. The force was broken up into national battalions. What this fostered 
was troop restrictive allegiance to their national units which created problems for overall 
command and control as well as discipline. There were anomalies in the appointment of the 
Deputy Force Commander and the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff was a Brigadier from 
Nigeria, while the Deputy Force Commander was originally a Lt. Colonel from Guinea. He was 
later promoted to the rank of Lt General to meet the qualification for a Deputy Force 
Commander. All these created problems of discipline, control and inefficiencies. Iweze, who 
was the Chief of Staff, recounts that when the Sierra Leone President, Joseph Momoh, arrived 
to address the troops before their departure for Liberia, the Chief of Staff, in the absence of the 
Deputy Force Commander, instructed the Ghana...ian battalion Commander to bring the troops 
to attention or order and then hand over to him. He will in turn report, according to military 
procedure, to the august visitor. The commander retorted that it was impossible for him a 
Ghanaian to hand over to a Nigerian, whereupon the Chief of Staff replied that he would not 
be handing over to a Nigerian but rather to a Chief of Staff who was a Nigerian ( Iweze, 
1993:223). Obviously if there was a laid down command structure, this unhealthy stand- off 
would not have occurred. Besides, it may have been that his rank as a major must have 
\ 
encouraged others to undermine his authority. 
J 
The break down of command resulting from lack of standard operating procedure was very 
much in evident in the execution of tasks assigned to the Guinean battalion. It enjoyed a certain 
kind of independence in operation which proved disruptive to the overall' plan of the 
organization. Each time they captured their target, they subsequently withdrew for it to be 
recaptured by the NPFL. As was later explained by the Deputy Force Commander, who was 
a Guinean, the behaviour of the battalion stemmed from the fact that it was against the idea of 
each battalion being assigned to different task. What he preferred was the establishment of a 
multinational units assigned to different tasks. He further ~tated that he felt it would be 
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expedient to leave the objective plan of each battalion to its commander. There was also the 
feeling among the Guineans that they had been singled out for the most difficult task. Mter 
extensive discussion with the leadership of that battalion, they did eventually recapture their 
target and even went beyond it, however, they proceeded to rescue their nationals held in the 
Guinean embassy. In the excitement and jubilation that followed the reunion, the original 
mission to hold their target so as to link up with the Ghanaian battalion coming from the rear 
was torpedoed. The result was that the NPFL sUlTounded them, when they were finally rescued 
by Ghanaian forces, they had already lost four men and an armoured fighting vehicle (Ibid.: 
227). There is no doubt that the language barrier must have contributed to the Guinean 
battalion's predicament. Instructions were issued in English to a battalion which was French. 
It is possible they never grasp the full imports of the instructions given to them. Eventhough 
I weze ( 1993) stated that the commander of that battalion was asked whether he had understood 
the instruction and replied in the affirmative there is a strong possibility the understanding may 
not have been complete. This assertion is mad~ in the light of some of the events which 
OCCUlTed. 
The problem of command and control affected the effective implementation of the evacuation 
exercise, the evacuation of different nationals. The sprit of nationalism pervaded the exercise. 
Each of the nations wanted a special treatment for their nationals. The corollary was that with 
each of the national units offering maximum protection for its nationals, there were not enough , 
free hands left to offer protection for the refugees who did not have representations. Those 
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became very vulnerable. One group of refugees who fell into this category were the Krahns, 
the clansmen of Samuel Doe. Prince Johnson who had unlimited access to the headquarters, 
where the refugees were kept, would from time to time fetch some of the Krahn people to be 
"punished". For example, Johnson was reported to have hand- picked 30 former government 
officials for execution., including the Police Chief, Alfred Fofana and the Commisioner for 
Excise and Tax, who were first cousins of Samuel Doe (West Africa, 15 - 21 October 1990). 
When the remnants of the Armed Forces of Liberia, who were largely Krahn had wind of this 
treatment, they were incensed so much so that they vowed to go to the headquarters to give 
their clansmen the needed protection. What followed was a mayhem as on their way they set 
a lot of public buildings on fire. It must be stated that the freedom that Johnson had, as a result 
of inefficient leadership in the command structure of ECOMOG at the initial stage of its 
mission, undermined the force's credibility as impartial and non - partisan in the conflict. This 
would in later period serve to foster distrust in the intentions and capabilities of the Forces. It 
will therefore not be out of place to assert that such atmosphere of distrust must have accounted 
for the lack of cooperation of the main protagonist in the conflict, Charles Taylor. 
Lack of Requisite Personnel 
Undoubtedly the efficiency with which an organization executes a given task as Allison (1969 
and 1971) asserts, depends to a very great extent on the availability of the requisite personnel, 
having the corresponding skills, knowledge and experience needed for the successful 
implementation of the given task. At the initial stage of ECOMOG operations the officer 
picked to head the mission had had no prior expi(rience in Peace - keeping. He was therefore 
ill - equipped for the task assigned. Apparently his inexperience, in part accounted for some 
of the" blotches" in the operation. A Peace - keeping force has to be above the fray on the 
ground, as much as conditions permit because its credibility to a large extent depends on the 
level of its neutrality. It is prohibited to engage in any activity or liaison which may be 
construed or misconstrued as instance of bias towards one faction or cooperation with that 
faction. In essence, the leadership of the Peace - keeping force is obliged to communicate 
\ 
unequivocally by deeds and pronouncements that it cherishes and would maintain at all times 
J 
its neutral status. This principle was sacrifice at the initial stages of the operations. The force 
. 
commander was known to have been very accommodative towards Prince Johnson. He was 
forever popping in and out of the Force Headquarters with his body guards armed to the teeth! 
with the tacit consent of the force commander. An episode was recounted where 'the Chief of 
Staff expressed his disapproval before Johnson of his habit of going into the Headquarters with 
an entourage fully armed and impressed it upon him that it was against military protocol. He 
understood the logic of the Chief of Staff s argument and promised to abide by it. Johnson later 
in his usual visit with the Force Commander reported the incident to him, who on receipt of 
that report told the Chief of Staff that he had told Johnson t~ disregard his instruction. The 
liaison between Johnson and ECOMOG included the presentation of gifts to the force, which 
included the supply of uniforms, boots and souvenirs to the troops! (Iweze, 1993: 231). 
It was during one of his routine visits to the head -quarters that he encountered Samuel Doe, 
the besieged President of Liberia at the time, and his entourage. Doe had visited the camp in 
spite of procedure agreed upon that communications between him and the head- quarters should 
be facilitated through a liaison officer ( Ibid.: 229). He had come to remonstrate with the 
leadership of ECOMOG for ignoring his invitation to them to pay him a courtesy call as state 
protocol demanded. He apparently still regarded himself as the President of Liberia, 
notwithstanding the fact that he had lost 90% of the country he ruled and been reduced to a 
fugitive holed up in the Executive Mansion. In the argument that followed the encounter 
between Johnson and Samuel Doe, a scuffle broke out leading to the capture and subsequent 
assassination of Doe by the forces of Prince Johnson. All this took place right in the head -
quarters of ECOMOG. At the time" hell broke lpose" the force commander disappeared from 
sight and when he reappeared, his main preoccupation was to take pictures of the dead bodies 
littered around. I believe this is inefficiency at its height. He was later heard to have remarked 
that it was wrong to have sent a Peace - keeping force. His replacement with another 
commander from Nigeria helped infuse greater sense of purpose, direction and efficiency. 
Also some of the officers were put into positions in which their experience and qualifications 
~ 
at the time ill - equipped them to perform successfully the demands of the positions. For 
example, it was decided that the Deputy Force Commander should be a Guinean and the 
minimum qualification for that position should be a Brigadier. It happened that the only 
Brigadier Giunea had was the President, the Guinean who got chosen to occupy the Deputy 
Force Commander slot was a Lt Colonel. He was later elevated to the position of Lt General 
in commensuration with that position. The position of Chief of Staff which normally requires 
a General was given to a Brigadier in the Nigerian Army. Obviously such appointments 
imparted negatively on the command and control structure of the force and may have 
contributed to the inefficiencies in the implementation process. 
Inadequate Organizational Intelligence 
Adequate organizational intelligence on for example, the intended theatre of operation is very 
important in the decision - making and implementation process. Among other things, it serves 
to determine the appropriate course of action to be taken. In fact, decisions are made based on 
organizational intelligence. The operation was mounted without adequate knowledge of the 
operational milieu ( Iweze, 1993:221). He points out that: " ... a correct assessment of the 
situation was not made in order to present a clear picture of what was happening". They did 
not have military map of the country at the onset, what they had was a tourist map of 
Monrovia, which served as the basis for the initial planning. It accounted for the 
underestimation of the military strength of Charles Taylor's NPFL. The flaw in the intelligence 
set up accounted for the selection of the harbour area as the Force -Headquarters. It proved to 
be unsuitable as it came under persistent artillery fue from the NPFL (Iweze, 1993: 224). 
Ineffective Communication 
Furthermore, there were communication problems which delayed the transmission of vital 
messages, fust, between the field and ECOWAS Secretariat and secondly between the Force 
Headquarters and other units. Such bottlenecks in communication may have delayed or 
prevented the implementation of decisions and delays in implementation of missions assigned 
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to units further afield. There was ineffective communication between the Force He~dquarters 
and the Naval and Aerial arms of the operation. Missions needed to be implemented by the Air 
Force, which was based in FreeTown, Sierra Leone, had to be relayed to them via Accra, 
Ghana and vice - versa. The length of time taken to get information to and from policy-
makers was frustratingly long, in part because the communication devices like the radio were 
not functioning properly. There was a case where the force had receipt of a decision one month 
after it had been taken by the ECOW AS Committee!. 
In relation to communication it could also be said that the recommendation to the effect that 
each contributing country should provide the logistical needs of their contingent, induced some 
of them to bring their own communication equipment. What therefore happened was that 
contrary to the order issued by the Field Headquarters that the general ones provided by Nigeria 
should be used for communication, other contingents refused to use them to communicate with 
their home government, they rather used theirs. They therefore breached the channel of 
communication (Iweze, 1993:238). In some sense they may have been at ease using their own 
gadgets because of familiarity with them. 
Implementation of the Ahuja Peace Agreement - A Case of Organizational Outputs. 
When sanity finally prevailed as indicated by the general goodwill on the part of all the stake 
holders in the conflict to accede to the peace formula as stipulated in the Abuja Agreement of 
1996, the implementation of the peace plan which represented a continuum from cease - ftre 
or cessation of hostilities, encampment, disarmament and demobilization, rehabilitation or 
reintegration to general and presidential electio?s was made possible by the capabilities of 
various governmental, inter- governmental and non - governmental organizations. It is note 
worthy that the modalities for the conduct of a free and fair elections as adopted by the 
decision - makers of the Economic Community of West African ~tates was the result of 
organizational activity. A United Nations Team of Consultants appointed by the Secretary-
General was charged with the responsibility to consult with Liberian leaders in December, 1996 
to ascertain the steps needed to create a viable and credible Frame - work for free and fair 
\ 
elections by May, 1997. Based on their findings, they prepared a draft recommendation on the 
I 
following general steps : A fair and credible political frame - work, an efficient and well 
planned electoral operations and adequate support from the international community. The draft 
recommendations were proposed to the Chairman of ECOW AS who accepted it in principle 
as "a provisional electoral package for the forthcoming elections". It was subsequently accepted 
at a special meeting of ECOW AS Committee of Nine ( a group given the task of monitoring 
the peace process) as part of the frame- work of Abuja Agreement. 
The task to be implemented without doubt was indeed a daunting one, however, the 
complexities and uncertainties involved were kept at a mi~imum, in fact, remQved by the 
principle of " fractionated" attention to goals ( Allison,1969). It meant that the tasks to be 
performed was cut up into " slices" and each piece parcelled out to a unit with the necessary 
expertise and repertoire to execute it, and a co -ordinating body to liaise between the various 
units. This is necessary, as the co - ordinating body form the heart of the operation, it helps to 
ensure that there is no break in the chain of activities which is crucial for the ultimate success 
of the entire programme. The military aspect of the programme was entrusted to ECOMOG and 
the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia ( UNOMIL). ECOMOG had the task of 
deploying to the entire country, to perform such tasks as establishing and providing security 
at Assembly and Encampment sites, disarming the various combatants, enforcing arms 
embargo at the various borders and maintaining general security throughout the country. 
UNOMIL was entrusted largely with the task of observing, verifying and reporting on the 
process. 
Previously, ECOMOG could not implement this task, in part because it did not have the 
requisite logistics and required a number of troops to fan out through the entire country. It 
could only do so when its military strength was boosted to 8,430 by June, 1995, with troops 
coming from as far as a Uganda and Tanzania, coupled with financial assistance from the 
international community. As a result, by 27 February 1997, a total of 20,332 fighters had been 
demobilised. It included 4,306 child - soldiers and 250 adult female fighters. It had established 
15 Disarmament sites as well as mobile disarmament tents to reach fighters in remote areas ( , 
United Nations Public Information Department at website: 
,I 
www.un.org!DeptJDPICD/missioniunomil-bhtm).· 
Co - ordination of Organizational Activities 
To link up the various efforts of individual units, the Humanitarian Assistance Co - ordination 
Organ (HACO) headed by a UN appointee, was set up in 1995. It had two sub - units namely, 
a Humanitarian Reintegration Unit and a Demobilization and Reintegration Unit. The HACO 
was composed of representatives from UNOMIL, United Nations Agencies, ECOMOG, the 
Liberian National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission (LNDDC), the-European 
Economic Union (EEU) the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and other international non - governmental organizations ( NGOs). HACO provided food, 
health services, shelter, water and basic sanitation for the Disarmament centres. It drew up a 
plan for child - soldiers and resettlement. 
After demobilization, those with no immediate means of livelihood were absorbed into 
bridging activities. These included work and training projects to ensure that they were 
productively engaged. It was indeed a provision to bridge the gap between disarmament and 
the long te11ll reintegration programme. The various specialised agencies contributed according 
to their areas of specialization. The Food and Agricultural Organization (F AO) provided hand 
tools and vegetable seeds. The United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) extended 
small grants to ex - combatants to start small scale projects; World Health Organization and 
UNICEF provided for the health needs of the people. For example, F AO embarked on a project 
of controlling cholera while UNICEF provided drugs and trained personnel to immunise 
children. To address the issue of demobilised child - soldiers, it supported the establishment 
of community centres for vocational and literacy training, the provision of shelters, transit 
homes and trauma counselling for children. The United Nations -High Commission for 
Refugees, repatriated and helped settle externally displaced Liberians scattered among countries 
such as Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. 
\ 
The elections, from its conceptualization to its implementation reveal organizational 
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capabilities. As was pointed out earlier on in the chapter, the frame - work for the election was 
an organizational output. The Liberian Independent Electoral Commission f011llulated and 
enforced guidelines through the assistance of ECOMOG and UNOMIL, for the conduct of 
elections. Organizations involved in the electoral process, such as the European Union and the 
International Foundation for Electoral System through their speciality in the field of elections 
provided such technical assistance as advice on election management, voter registration and 
civic education. Other assistance like material and logistic support was provided by 
organizations such as the Eu~pean Union. 
The following observations could be made from the above analyses: The decision - makers 
who presided over the Liberian crisis relied on existing laid down procedures and formulae or 
propositions to solve the Liberian question. The decisional processes were characterised largely 
by sequential attendance to problems; each decisional group which presided over the Liberian 
crisis made incremental adjustments to what has been established by its predecessor. Each was 
hampered in the quest to find solution to the issues at stake by the constraints of limited 
information, which may have put beyond their field of competence other complexities of the 
plot of the Liberian drama. It could only be unravelled one step at a time. Such revelations 
obviously negate the age - old realist assumptions that decision - makers, among other things, 
engage in conscious rational calculations of the decisions they make; which seems to suggest 
that they have at any point in time an unlimited pool of information to draw on. In addition 
to this, the analyses have established that the decision - makers relied on organizational outputs 
in the formulation and implementation of decisions. It had also shown that if successful or 
satisfactory implementation of decisions hinge i.n part on established standard procedure of 
organizational units then its absence would as well account for flaws in the implementation 
process as was evident in ECOMOG's initial operations. 
! 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BOTTLE - NECKS IN THE DECISIONAL PROCESS - A CASE OF " GROUP -
THINK" 
The Liberian drama was more and more becoming a human catastrophe of frightening 
proportion as a result of the fratricidal dimension it assumed, with the concomitant loss oflives, 
property and massive human dislocation. The chapter argues, contrary to criticisms levelled 
against the decision to deploy a Peace - keeping force to intervene in the Liberian imbroglio, 
that the decision was expedient and propitious. However, it also seeks to show that there were 
flaws in the decision - making process which culminated in the establishment of ECOMOG. 
The defects are traceable to what Janis ( 1972) refers to as " group - think" syndrome: A set 
of characteristics accountable for faulty decision - making. In one sense the flaws had the 
effect of making the deployment unacceptable to.the principal disputant in the conflict and his 
regional backers, this arguably helped to prolong the conflict. It also discusses the reasons for 
the successful resolution of the impasse and postulates that this laid the basis for the eventual 
resolution of the conflict. 
Much controversy accompanied the Mediation Committee's decision to send an intervention 
force into Liberia at the height of the civil conflict in that country, ostensibly to stop the 
~ 
carnage being wrought out there. Among the criticisms were that the force will be inserted into 
) 
a theatre of conflict in which there was no cease - fire in place. A Peace - keeping force is 
deployed based on the premise that all the disputants to the conflict have agreed to a cease -
fire. However, in the case of Liberia the major antagonist, Charles Taylor, and his NPFL had 
not consented to lay down their arms. Besides, legal arguments have been used against the 
decision. It was seen as a violation of the " sacrosanct" provisions of the O.AU, which inter 
alia, prohibits the meddling in the internal affairs of a member state, seen as a violation of the 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the state. Others contend that the decisional group 
failed to follow the laid down procedure of ECOW AS and therefore did not have the mandate 
to set up an intervention force. This, they argued requires the _consent of the full house. 
The Liberian saga was indeed a " Catch 22" scenario; the decision to intervene broke one of 
the tenets of the principle of Peace - keeping, which advocates for the consent of the parties 
to the conflict. On the other hand not to have intervened would have presented the sub - region 
with a huge human tragedy of callousness, chaos, suffering and misery. Again, the charge that 
the intervention was a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state shows 
a poor grasps of the reality on the ground. Undoubtedly, one of the essential characteristics of 
state - hood, in fact what accords it a legal personality before international law is the 
government's title to territory and its effective control over it ( Starke, 1984). In the light of 
this fact, it could be stated that the viability of the state at the time of the conflict was indeed 
suspect. Doe could no longer be spoken of as having any effective control over Liberia. His 
forces abysmally controlled a section of Monrovia, while he was holed up in the Presidential 
Mansion. There were in reality two governments in place, Doe's precariously based in 
Monrovia and Charles Taylor's, unchallengeably. based in Gbarnga. As a result the territory and 
the state - hood of Liberia was in contention. The break down of the state structure therefore 
warranted regional intervention. 
To the charge that the decisional group lacked the competence to set,up the force, it could in 
part be refuted on the grounds that, the ECOW AS Summit summoned to consider the 
establishment of ECOMOG was attended only by the members of the Mediation Committee, 
other members failed to attend (Adisa, 1993). It could therefore be asserted that the decision 
was therefore binding on the member states who were absent. Besides, extra Liberian actors 
l 
were involved in the Liberian " drama" which therefore effectively internationalized the 
. 
conflict. The ECOW AS Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) sanctions 
intervention when the conflict is no longer an exclusively internal one. Countries like Cote 
d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso and Libya were known to be involved in the conflict (Anning, 1999 
and Dunn, 1998). 
It is the expressed view of this chapter therefore, that it is not the decision to intervene which 
is to be at issue but rather the defects in the decision - making process to establish ECOMOG. 
The defects could be traceable to the group which constituted the Mediation Committee. It is 
the view of this section of the essay that the group exhibited traits which Janis refers to as " 
Group - Think" syndrome. A set of characteristics which a great number of decisional groups 
share and this contributes largely to faulty decisions. 
Homogeneity of the Decisional Group - Linguistic Affinity 
The group that met as the Mediation Committee was largely homogenous. To begin with, most 
of the members belong to the same linguistic bloc, the Anglophone, besides the fact that such 
common linguistic background creates a natural affinity for bonding, the sub - regional politics 
has always been a polarised one. It has always witnessed a cleavage between the Francophone 
and the Anglophone linguistic blocs, marked by suspicions and rivalry in their quest for pre -
eminent position in the affairs of the sub - region. It is therefore not suprising that, the group, 
predominantly Anglophone came to share a common opinion with regard to immediate 
intervention, dictated by national and regional ~curity concerns. Sir Dawda Jawara, the then 
ECOW AS Chairman and member of the group, commenting on the misunderstanding which 
ensued upon the establishment of ECOMOG concurs that : " ... it had been along linguistic 
lines" ( West Africa, 9 - 15 September 1991). Besides, their d~cision must have been 
influenced by the fact that already there were some members of the Francophone bloc, namely 
Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso actively supporting the major belligerent in the conflict. 
A Sense of Camaraderie 
There was a strong bond of friendship and cooperation among the major members of the group. 
Joseph Momoh of Sierra Leone had a personal relationship with Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria. 
It was a friendship which dated back to the period when both of them were student at the 
Nigerian Defence Academy in Kaduna ( Adisa, 1993). Nigeria already had a military and 
judiciary arrangements with Sir Dawda Jawara's Gambia. The then head of the armed forces 
of the Gambia was a Nigerian, Abubakar, who later became the transitional Head of State of 
Nigeria after the mysterious death of Sunni Abacha. Nigerian judges were on secondment to 
Gambia. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Babangida had a good chemistry between them, besides, 
the economic bond between them must have been very strong. For example Ghana relies 
hugely on subsidised oil from Nigeria. It is suprising to note that Eyadema of Togo was party 
to the decision to set up the intervention force. He must have been influenced by the spirit of 
cooperation that existed between Togo and Nigeria. Eyadema and his predecessor, Sylvio 
Olympio, are famed for their cooperation with successive Nigerian leaders. For example, 
Sylvio Olympio and his counterpart in Nigeria in 1962, proposed the establishment of a 
Custom Union to embrace Nigeria, Niger, Togo and Dahomey ( Benin) which was however 
foiled by de Gaule and his African Advisor, M. Foccart. Eyadema and Gowon were the key 
instrument behind the establishment of ECOWAS in 1976. He also had a close personal 
relationship with Obasanjo and Babangida ( Ate, 1983; Adisa, 1993: 139). However, in the 
light of his subsequent change of mind, seen through his failure to contribute troops at the 
eleventh hour leads one to conclude that he must have been faced with a decisional conflict: 
He must have been compelled to go along with the decision because of his lack of "nerve" to 
break the homogeneity of the group. This line of reasoning becomes plausible especially when 
examined in the light of the comment he made about the Mediation Committee. He was 
purported to have expressed his misgivings and unhappiness of the" free wheeling role the 
Mediation cabal had adopted" ( West Africa, 3 - 9 September, 1990). On the other hand, it 
must have stemmed from external pressure from the Francophone states involved in the 
conflict, especially Houphouet Boigny. 
Shared Apprehensions 
,/ 
Moreover, the group was united in a common apprehension about the precedence being set by 
Charles Taylor's insurgency. Momoh, Rawlings, Jawara, Babangida and others must have 
perceived that if it was left unchecked it may destabilise the entire sub - region. It was reasoned 
that an insurgency masterminded by a civilian constituted a dangerous virus in the body politic 
of the sub - region. The New Africa (October 1991: 11 - 16) was apt when it asserted that: 
" ... there was general consensus that Taylor's virus must be stopped before it contaminates the 
whole of West Africa sub - Eegion". It further argues that it marked the first major attempt in 
which ordinary civilians backed by few trained commandoes }lave taken up arms to overthrow 
a military dictatorship. It further asserts that it was a common fear that it may be replicated in 
other parts of the sub - region thus threatening the security of the region and the various 
dictatorial military regimes. The apprehension expressed here is captured in the statement of 
the Guinean President, who was party to the decision to set up the force. He stated that: " 
Charles Taylor is a bad example. Civilians should not be encouraged to overthrow military 
regimes (West Africa, 28 November- 2 December, 1990). This fear gains additional cogency 
when examined in the light of the fact of the report that sub - regional nationals, trained in 
Libya, like Ghanaians, Gambians, Sierra Leoneans and possibly Nigerians formed part of 
Charles Taylor's NPFL. Sir Dawda Jawara, in an interview with the West Africa affirmed this 
and expressed the fear that if : " ... Charles Taylor with the support of what I may call 
mercenaries from the other countries of the sub - region were to come to power by force, one 
can imagine the implication it will have for sub - regional security ... " ( West Africa, 28 
November - 2 December 1990). 
Shared Ideology 
Most of the members had a common military background, which may have predisposed them 
towards impetuous militaristic solutions rather than engaging in any effective diplomatic 
negotiations to win over opponents to accept the intervention formula. The consensus of the 
group must have shut out any other alternative options. For instance, the Malian representative 
\ 
wanted a cease - fire before the deployment of the Peace - keeping force. It was as a result of 
J 
the rejection of this option that a statement was issued that Mali would not be contributing 
troops to ECOMOG. It must also be stated that Eyadema of Togo deploring the dictatorial 
nature of the group was reputed to have spoken against the" free wheeling style of the 
Mediation cabal" ( West Africa, 3 - 9 September, 1990). 
Misperceptions of the Operational Milieu 
Janis ( 1972) contends that~uch a decisional group tends to have a wrong perception of the 
enemy and the operational environment out there. This may_in part be due to a perception of 
" invincibility" of the group which borders on recklessness and risks. There was the perception 
that with the calibre of force at their disposal Charles Taylor's forces and other belligerents 
could easily be intimidated into submission. Apparently this emboldened them to deploy a 
force into a dangerous terrain of conflict. This mentality must have also affected the disposition 
of the troops, in fact it must have affected the combat readiness of the force, a kind of 
complacency must have entered the psyche of the force. Iweze, the Field Commander from 
Nigeria, sums it up: " I remember in one of my discussions with one of the officials of 
ECOWAS, he had the impression that with the calibre of soldiers all the warring factions had, 
the sight of tanks, armoured cars and air crafts would scare the living daylight out of them and 
we will just walk over the area ... Many troops arrived without personal weapons ... " He 
continued that: " Some members of the troop were simply para - military personnel who only 
serve in their respective countries as custom and immigration officials ( Iweze, 1993:228). 
Undoubtedly their knowledge of the military strength of the NPFL was indeed poor! At the 
time of the deployment, Charles Taylor controll~d 90% of Liberia and was just at the treshold 
of power. He had unimpeded supply of arms and huge income from the extractive business in 
the area under his jurisdiction. Requesting for a cease - fire without seeking a meaningful 
compromise with him was bound to be unacceptable to him. Besides., they reckoned without 
the resolve and determination of the rank and file membership of NPFL, of fighters seasoned 
by an already militarised society, who saw their liberation and revenge for the atrocities they 
and their kin have suffered at the callous hands of Doe as tied up to the cause of Charles 
\ 
Taylor. It was a resolve which may have been strengthened by his vilification of the 
,I 
intervening force as the hand maid of Babangida, who was bent on bailing out his embattled 
crony, Doe. 
Inability to Seek Expert Advice 
The decisional process lacked informed expert assistance. It should be bourne in mind that the 
Committee which was a creation of ECOW AS, just like its parent organization, had had no 
prior political experience in conflict resolution. Until the advent of the Liberian conflict it had 
been primarily an economic organization with little or no experience in security issues. Such 
handicap could have been circumvented if the institutional and administrative structures 
undergirding the Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence had been put in place ( Anning, 
1999). The protocol itself seemed to have been forgotten. Thus, neither the Organization nor 
the Mediation Committee had the personnel with the requisite competence, experience, 
authority and negotiating skills required in mediation efforts. It has been attested that Abbas 
Bundu, the Chairman of ECOW AS, who engaged in initial mediation efforts to bring Charles 
Taylor and his regional backers on board was handicapped by the fact of his political 
inexperience. He lacked the authority ( for it was a common knowledge that he neither had the 
economic nor the political experience for the position of Secretary - General of the 
Organization) and the necessary diplomatic skills required to secure a harmonization of 
positions between Anglophones and Francophones. It was a tricky situation which was beyond 
his ability to pull off. For example, he failed to convince Charles Taylor to attend the Banjul 
conference, in which the IGNU was fOlmed ( Dunn, 1998). 
With such an apparent handicap, it will have been expedient to seek external assistance or 
cooperation. This assertion is made notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the crisis there 
seemed to be an international apathy to what was going on in Liberia. Given the intractable 
nature of the conflict, the unbridgeable polarity it created between the two linguistic blocs, the 
diplomatic stalemate, Charles Taylor's suspicion and hatred towards the Peace - keeping 
arrangement, it would have been sane to right at the onset mount up a v\gorous diplomatic 
campaign to secure a UN involvement. UN eventually got involved from 1993, blJ-t it was in 
a sense belated, because if it had been inv,0lved in the process at the beginning, the conflict 
may not have been protracted as it turned out to be. What was sorely needed to break the log-
jam was a credible third force, with the necessary expertise, experience, negotiating skills and 
authority, which the UN possessed. A similar effort could have been made to woo the U.S. into 
the process. It had a lot of clout over the major actors in the conflict which could have been 
successfully exploited. No attempt at the beginning was made in this direction. It is a behaviour 
consistent with "Group - Think" syndrome. 
Besides, no meaningful sustained effort was made to co - ordinate their efforts with that of the 
Inter - Faith Mediatory Council ( IFMC), which undoubtedly had informed knowledge of the 
socio - political dynamics of the Liberian affair (Dunn, 1998:890). The composition of the 
IGNU formed one of the basis for Charles Taylor's rejection of the peace plan. The plan called 
for the establishment of an interim government which would oversee the return of the country 
to a democratically elected government. In line with this, the Committee sponsored a 
conference in Banjul between 27 - 30 August 1990. The political and the civil groups who 
participated in the conference were largely exiles based in Sierra Leone. Most of them shared 
a common characteristic, they were loyal supporters of Amos Sawyer. At the end of the 
conference he was elected as the chairman of the interim government. The government was 
therefore filled with elements hated by Charles Taylor. There was already an antipathy between 
Charles Taylor and Amos Sawyer. He had for example, branded the politicians who had 
formed the government as cowards and conservatives because of their half - hearted effort to 
carry out armed struggle against Samuel Doe. Be"sides, he hated their brand of ideology, which 
was too leftist for his liking ( Dunn, 1998). A consultation with the IFMC would have produced 
a composition of a government which was centrist in outlook. Again, the exiles abroad, that 
is the Liberians outside Sierra Leone, in places like the U.S, were absynt from the conference. 
Their participation in the conference and inclusion in the government may have mollified 
Charles Taylor because of the influence they wielded over him. 
Intolerance of Opposing Views 
J 
Janis ( 1972) postulates that a decisional group which suffers from the "Group - Think" 
malaise, besides making no effort to seek external advice strives to reject views which are 
contrary to their preferred line of action. One sees this tendency in the Mediation group. The 
deployment of the force in the face of opposition from such heads of states as Campoare of 
Burkina Faso and Houphouet Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire was in a sense irrational. They were 
actively backing Charles Taylor not only in words but also in deeds. Blaise Campoare had 
provided bases for the training of NPFL fighters and depots for arms and ammunition coming 
from such countries as Libya. Cote d'Ivoire's borders, on_ the other hand, were opened to 
ensure the smooth passage of anns to the NPFL. They were therefore indispensable players in 
the Liberian "game". It is incontestable that they were opposed to intervention at the onset for 
personal and political reasons and therefore presented a formidable challenge. However, the 
fact of their indispensability alone should have spurred them on to embark on an intensive 
diplomatic drive to secure a compromise that may in the end have paved the way for a Peace 
-keeping force comprising a fair balance of Francophones and Anglophones. This would have 
lent credibility to ECOMOG. Such an opportunity was missed and as a result, ECOMOG was 
formed with the conspicuous absence of the major Francophone countries. It therefore had to 
"hobble" into Liberia with the huge liability of the preponderance of Nigerian participation. 
Lack of Contingency Plan 
One of the hallmarks of a good decision - making process, as Janis ( 1972) postulates is the 
ability of the decisional group to layout conting{(ncy plans. This is prudential especially in the 
world of anned conflicts where there are so many uncertainties ( Liberia was a typical 
example) and decisional goals are stifled by complexities on the operational field. The group, 
it appeared never had any contingency plan with regard to an alternative line of action in the 
event of NPFL resistance. I weze recalls that the political leaders were at a loss as to what 
should be done when the question was posed to them. Again, they did not have any clue to the 
next step, once the initial plan had been executed (Iweze,1993: 219). As a result, ECOMOG 
\ 
had to improvise solutions to problems as events unfolded in the Liberian political scenario. 
,i 
This accounted for some of the decisional blunders at the early stages of the operation. 
The homogeneity of the group produced a dangerous consensus, which denied them the healthy 
opportunity to critically examine their preferred course of action. As has been pointed out 
earlier, this alienated other major players in the conflict and effectively made the ECOMOG 
concept unacceptable to them. The next section of the chapter looks at how this situation was 
remedied. To lay the basis for the eventual resolution of the conflict. 
Recipe for Success 
It is an undisputable fact that any discussion of successes in the decisional process during the 
conflict in Liberia is bound to be relative. For as the conflict progressed it assumed a very 
complex and uncertain character. Factors such as co operational insecurities of the main 
protagonists in the conflict, proliferation of armed factions, differences over power sharing, 
mistrust and suspicions all contributed to its complexity and stoked it. On countless number of 
times accords were made and broken. Yet in the midst of such uncertainties, one thing 
remained certain and that is, the introduction of such ingredients as the effective external 
participation, accommodation of opponents and a dose of better grasp of the operational milieu 
helped to inject fresh life into the decisional process. It broke the log - jam, by bringing the 
dissenters into the process. This laid the foundation upon which the eventual successful 
resolution of the conflict rested. 
In an apparent move to correct the initial blunders, Babangida, besides embarking on a 
national, regional and international campaign to garner support for the Peace - keeping force, 
ceded the leading role in mediation efforts to Houphouet Boigny, the " Doyen" of the sub -
regional politics. This was evident in the Yamousoukro summit on Liberia in June, 1991. He 
assumed the chairmanship of the summit, which brought together all the major regional actors 
in the conflict, namely the heads of state of the Gambia ( Sir Dawda Jawara), Togo ( 
\ 
Eyadema), Nigeria (Babangida), Burkina Faso (Blaise Campoare), Cote d'Ivoire (Houphouet 
l 
Boigny) and Ghana ( Jerry Rawlings). T~e meeting was the first major attempt to break the 
stalemate between ECOMOG and Charles Taylor, who had previously resisted the intervention 
and the peace plan, especially the composition of the interim government. At the end of the 
summit it was reported that Charles Taylor and Amos Sawyer accepted the ECOW AS Peace 
Plan with the Francophones and Anglophones playing an important role in establishing a 
consensus. Houphouet Boigny observed that: " Our job was to reconcile the two of them. We 
will declare that there is only one winner, Liberia, which must find peace" ( West Africa, 8 -
14 July, 1991). 
As a result of the seeming success of the conference, a Committee of Five ( C5) was constituted 
to oversee other mediatory talks. It comprised representatives from Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, 
Togo, Guinea Bissau and the Gambia. It was under the chairmanship of Houphouet Boigny. 
The preponderance of Francophone membership on the committee was an apparent move to 
appease the Francophones who felt slighted by the Anglophone initiative. The newly found 
goodwill which came to exist between the two blocs found its most eloquent testimony in the 
fact that the C5 invited some of the members of the Standing Mediation Committee into their 
meetings. It was a successful cooperation which helped produce four accords in a row, the 
Yamousoukro I - IV Accords. It was reported that Houphouet Boigny's stewardship of the 
peace process gave Charles Taylor: " much succour and spurred him to acts of reconciliation" 
( West Africa, 9 - 15 September 1991: 1496). Taylor offered to release several hundred 
Nigerians, Ghanaians and Sierra Leoneans held hostage. He also formally requested the Red 
Cross to supervise the evacuation of refugees. Again, the goodwill translated into the 
establishment of an all encompassing MediationcCommittee (ESMC) at Cotonou, Benin on 7 
November,1992, a Committee of Nine (C9) conferred with the responsibilities to oversee the 
Liberian peace process was inaugurated. It comprised representatives from Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo, Nigeria, Gambia and Senegal. Thus as Anning 
(1999) points out after much squabbling, a compromise was achieved which helped merge the 
various major actors in the bid to resolve the Liberian question. 
~ 
Reliance on External Expertise - United States Involvement 
Janis ( 1972) postulates that a good decision - making process makes use of external expertise. 
The United States by her own volition, as a result of a change in policy, stayed away from any 
effective or direct participation in the quest for solution to the conflict. It rather ceded this 
responsibility to the sub - regional organizaton. However, her later involvement, though low 
key, brought without doubt into the process the sorely needed credibility, authority, skills, 
experience and the where - withal which helped break the impasse. 
The historical links between the u.s. and Liberia gave her an appreciable degree of influence 
over the domestic affairs of Liberia. It is an influence that stretches from the time she helped 
set up a republic of" freed black slaves" on the shores of Cape Mesurado in the mid nineteen 
century to the dictatorial regime of Samuel Doe in the 1980's. Liberians had always felt a 
certain kind of kinship with U.S. Dunn ( 1998:840) states that the U.S protected Liberia from 
external aggression, especially during the two world wars and mediated in conflicts between 
the natives and the settler community. 
The influence of the U.S at the early stages of the conflict could be gleaned from Charles 
Taylor's assertion in an interview conducted by Balfour Ankomah of New Africa. In the 
interview, he claimed that he could have easily taken Monrovia had the Americans not stopped 
him. He contended that, Herman Cohen, the U.S. Secretary for Mrican Affairs, anticipating 
a blood - bath in the event of an NPFL military assault on Monrovia, contacted him in Liberia 
and prevailed upon him to desist from such attac~. He also urged him to leave Monrovia open 
to allow people to flee unimpeded to Sierra Leone. On hindsight, he lamented taking his 
advice: " I made a terrible mistake, terrible mistake, very, very bad mistake ... There was no 
fighting by our soldiers in Monrovia" (New Africa, October, 1992: 1.2). 
It is significant to note that when the U.S. began to take an interest in the Liberian question, 
it helped through its representatives break the log - jam between Charles Taylor, his regional 
backers and ECOMOG. The U.S. Congressman, Mervyn Dymally, who wa~ then the Chairman 
,I 
of the U.S. House of Representatives for Foreign Mfairs Sub - Committee on Mrica met with 
both Amos Sawyer and NPFL leader Charles Taylor and secured their consent to meet in 
Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire to discuss the future of Liberia (West Africa, 13 - 19 May, 1991). It 
was an event which led to the agreement to a cease - fire at the Yamousoukro Conference, 
which the U.S. co - sponsored. Thus, at the end of the day through the influence, authority, 
diplomatic skills vested in her representatives, all the major stake - holders in the conflict sat 
together in a spirit of cooperation to constructively engage each other in a bid to solve the 
Liberian puzzle. 
One of the sticking points in the effort to solve the Liberian problem was that ECOMOG was 
hamstrung from the onset because of its largely Anglophone composition. Charles Taylor 
repeatedly made issue out of this. He accused it of being hijacked by Nigeria, which had a 
hidden agenda and that it was impartial. In fact, it provided him with a convenient excuse to 
dishonour his commitments to agreements made, ( including his promise to allow his troops 
to be encamped and demobilised). The major Francophone countries were out of ECOMOG. 
The only Francophone member which had troops in the Peace - keeping force was Guinea. But 
its credibility and impartiality was doubtful as a result of Lansana's vested interest in the 
conflict, which was really anti - Taylor. Repeated calls by the Anglophones to such countries 
as Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire to contribute troops had gone unheeded. What was therefore 
needed was some one who could successfully bring on board the Francophones to give 
ECOMOG the credibility it needed and to neutralise Taylor's excuse. 
President Bush, the U.S. Special Representative.for Africa, Herman Cohen and James Baker, 
the Secretary of State, at different times sought to persuade Abdou Diouf, the President of 
Senegal, to contribute troops to ECOMOG. An interplay of diplomacy and financial 
inducements in the end secured the consent of Diouf to contribl!te Sengalese troops to 
ECOMOG. The Senegalese troops were subsequently deployed for Peace - keeping exercise 
in the northern Liberian market town of Vahun. Six Senegalese soldiers in the area immediately 
after their deployment were killed by the NPFL. It happened at the back - drop of renewed 
accusations by Charles Taylor that ECOMOG was in league with a new armkd group, ULIMO, 
I 
which was fighting against the NPFL Taylor claimed: " We have proof on film tliat ULIMO 
. 
soldiers are training in camps in Conakry, Guinea and Sierra Leone" ( West Africa, 25 - 31 
January 1993; Mortimer,1998). The countries named had troops in ECOMOG. This twist in 
the Liberian game, in essence, made redundant the raison d'etre of Senegalese participation 
in ECOMOG. With the rising tide of public opinion against Senegal's participation, elections 
just around the comer and troubles in Senegal's Casamance province, Diouf felt convinced that 
he would be better off if the troops were back home (Mortimer, 1998: 123 - 137). What could 
be salvaged from the wreck of Senegalese involvement? To begin with, Through U.S. 
diplomacy, the awkward situation of Francophone absence from the intervention force was 
removed. It helped expose Taylor as one who was not interested in peace and therefore made 
it impossible for his allies to stand by him. 
United Nations - Organization of African Unity's Involvement 
The solicitation of the U.N assistance at the later stage in the conflict gave a fillip to the 
decision - making and implementation process. It brought into the process the expertise and 
experience of its representatives into the mediation process. It contributed immensely to lend 
credibility to the decisional groups' search for peace. Following the joint meeting of the 
Committee of Five and the Standing Mediation at Cotonou, Benin, on 20 October, 1992, a 
communique was issued on 7 November, 1992 at Abuja, which among other things, requested 
the U.N to send a group of observers to monitor the encampment and disarmament of the 
warring factions. It was a request that induced the Security Council to recommend the 
appointment by the Secretary - General of the V.N, a Special Representative to assist in the 
mediation efforts. The U.N therefore actively, by the appointment of the Special 
Representative, from November, 1993 participated in the process (The United Nations Public 
Information Department, 1997, website: www.un.org.deptJmissionlunomil). Through its 
representatives the UN undertook diplomatic moves to urge the ECOW AS countries to pursue 
a unified approach to the Liberian problem. The UN became an effective partner with the 
Mediation Committee in negotiating the various peace accords and agreements and effectively 
, 
used the factions to pursue a peaceful solution to the crisis. The Special Representative along 
J 
with his O.A.U. counterpart from Zimbabwe, Professor Canaan Banana, spearheaded the 
. 
Geneva and Cotonou negotiations which produced the Accord of 25 July, 1993. The accord 
marked an important turning point in the history of the various efforts made to bring the crisis 
to an end. It became the referent point for all other subsequent accords ( Abiodun, 1999). 
Cotonou marked a break with all the previous agreements in one special sense, that is it was 
the first serious attempt to come to terms with the power dynamics of Liberia at war. All the 
previous agreements effectively barred the armed factions from any effective participation in 
the interim government. However, the Cotonou negotiations brought them on board. 
Undoubtedly this inclusion of armed factions in the interim government, especially when the 
leaders finally directly participated in it by the Abuja Agreement, contributed immensely to 
bring the conflict to its logical conclusion. Besides, through the UN - O.A.U. participation, 
extra sub - regional troops were introduced, making ECOMOG more internationalised and 
credible. When goodwill finally prevailed the new ECOMOG presented a face benign and 
acceptable enough for the forces of the main antagonist, Charles Taylor, to agree to be 
disarmed and demobilised. 
Thus far the following proposition could be made: That, misconceptions about the operational 
milieu, among other things, accounted for the under estimation of the force potential of the 
main protagonist in the conflict; that it accounted for lack of any effective efforts by the 
decisional group at the onset to build bridges to the major regional backers of the main 
antagonist; that it reflected in the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity, 
which was in reality unrepresentative of the political realities of Liberia and that it showed in 
the deployment of an intervention force whose c<,?mposition was regionally less representative. 
The creases in the decisional process were however ironed out by a reconstituted, reinvigorated 
and an enlarged Mediation units: The decisions made by such bodies, such as gathering in of 
the major actors, diversifying the force structure of ECOOM0; acknowledging the 
indispensability of the principal disputant in the conflict and bringing the armed factions into 
the interim government, showed a better grasp of the operational milieu. Furthermore the 
transformation of the decisional environment from a highly homogenous one to a more 
\ 
diversified and heterogeneous one produced the compromises and the goodwill that 
J 
underpinned the successes in the varied efforts to find a lasting peace for Liberia. Besides, the 
. 
external support and expertise in no small measure contributed to lay the foundation for the 
solution of the Liberian question. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This survey set out to investigate to what extent the various assumptions of decision - making 
theories and some of the models that have flowed out of them, namely Allison's conceptual 
models of decision - making, Janis" Group - Think" model and the propositions each 
postulates helped to unearth the essence of decision - making and implementation processes 
which underpinned the establishment of ECOMOG as well as the decisional character of the 
flrst Standing Mediation Committee and various summits which produced the accords. In 
relation to this, chapter Two set the scene by offering a discussion of theoretical assumptions 
of Decision - Making Theory. 
Chapter Three revealed that some of the assumptions of the rational Actor and Bureaucratic 
Process models of decision - making explain the decisional process to set up ECOMOG. 
Trailing in the footsteps of Allison, the study set out in Chapter Four to flnd out the extent to 
which the decision taken by the political leaders as revealed in ~hapter Three and its 
implementation was made possible by organizational output. It was discovered that some of 
the assumptions which underline Allison's Organizational Process Model in decision - making 
hold true in so far as the decision to set up ECOMOG and the tasks to be performed are 
~ 
concerned. It has shown that the decision could not necessarily have seen the light of day 
,I 
without organizational outputs. However, the study found out that such organizational 
characteristics as the existence of standard operating procedure ( SOP), the requisite manpower 
and intelligence crucial for successful implementation of tasks were largely absent. The survey 
has demonstrated to an appreciable degree that the non existence of the appropriate supporting 
institutional and administrative structures at the time the Liberian conflict erupted, contributed 
to the flaws in the implementation of task at the beginning of ECOMOG's operations. 
Earlier on in Chapter Four, the survey had revealed that contrary to rationalists suppositions 
that decision -makers confronted with a problem at any particular moment always examine a 
whole range of options and rationally make a decision. A careful tracking of the entire efforts 
made at resolving the saga, from individual efforts at brokering peace between the belligerents 
to the collective efforts revealed that the decision makers or the facilitators never at any point 
in time grasped every nuance of the complexity of the Liberian conflict. As a result, they could 
only solve problems on sequential basis. It has also confirmed that decision - makers rely on 
laid down procedures in solving problems. Such behaviour of a political decisional unit seems 
to confirm the notion that owing to the great variety that inhere in any situation, decision -
makers can only solve problems on an incremental basis. The study has therefore discovered 
that organizational mode of problem solving is as well traceable to political decisional units. 
Also, as was evident in Chapter Five, a critical analyses of the decisional group, the ECOMOG 
Standing Mediation Committee set up at the beginning of the conflict, have shown that an 
appreciable number of the characteristics spelled out by Janis ( 1972) as contributing factors for 
faulty decision - making process are discernible in the group which met to decide on the 
formation of ECOMOG. It has shown that such " Group - Think" traits as esprit de corp, 
homogenial atmosphere, consensus seeking, non critical appraisal of preferred decisions, 
illusions about the operational milieu, unpreparedness to accommodat~ the views or criticism 
of others and failure to seek external informed assistance, absence of contingency plans were 
among the characteristics exhibited by the group which composed the first Mediation 
Committee. The flaws made the decision taken to be unattractive to the major stake - holder 
in the conflict and his regional backers. \ 
,I 
The second section of this Chapter which adopted Janis ( 1972) recipe of successful decision 
- making process discovered that when external expertise was sought, when in - roads were 
made to achieve constructive consensus, based on compromises through diversifying the 
composition of the decisional groups and when the operational milieu have been sufficiently 
mastered these paved the way for the eventual resolution of the conflict. 
It must however be stated that the successful resolution of the conflict delayed in part because 
of unforeseen bed fellows of armed conflict. Like cooperational insecurities, proliferation of 
anned factions, mistrusts and suspicions among actors in the conflict, personal ambitions and 
differences over power sharing. It must have also been due to lack of critical appraisal by the 
decisional group at any given stage of efforts at resol ving the conflict or the problems they were 
confronted with. In the light of the foregone conclusions the following propositions are made 
with the view to help" prime" the decision - making and implementation machinery of 
ECOWAS. 
General Propositions 
The West Africa sub - regional political theatre is a re- enactment of the old Anglo - Franco 
rivalries of the colonial era. The same old competition for pre - eminence, mistrusts and fears 
that informed the relationships of their colonial masters hang like an "albatross" on the necks 
of the Anglophone - Francophone leaders of the sub - continent. Adding to this has been the 
half - hearted commitment of Francophone Wes: Africa to the affairs of the sub - continent. 
The apathy finds expression in the existence within the sub - region of parallel economic 
groupings, whose functions are indeed duplicatory. Operating simultaneously with ECOWAS, 
the umbrella economic body that caters for the entire sub - regiol! is the corresponding 
Francophone economic zone, the CEAO. It has an exclusive collective security regime in 
ANAD, which was helped set up by France. 
\ 
It gives prime attention to its relationship with France, to the detriment of the cohesion needed 
,I 
for effective sub - regional development and stability. The compactness ofthe relationship with 
France could be seen through the various cooperational agreements the countries, in their 
individual and collective capacities have forged with France. Ali Mazrui puts the solidity of the 
relationship in perspective when he asserts: " ... apartheid is an anachronism and 'hated by all 
blacks in South Africa. French culture is loved by its victims in West Africa. South Africans 
are seeking to be redeemed from white racial hegemony, many West Africans are contented to 
bask in France's cultural hegemony" (Mazrui, 1983; Ate, 1983). France's unparellel interest in 
Africa and in particular West Africa, an interest which is destructive to sub - regional unity, 
~ 
has meant that the Francophone bloc side with the interest of the ex - colonial 1:)oss. This 
attitude has in part been an irritant link in the decision - making and implementation process 
of the sub - region. Liberia presents a classic example of such frustration. 
The question now is, what measures need to be adopted to remove such barrier to the cohesion 
and the political goodwill needed to take decisions and implement them? Undoubtedly one of 
the attractions of France to the Francophone bloc has been the economic support that she offers. 
Therefore, it behoves on the economic giants within the sub - region, especially Nigeria given 
its middle power potentials, to take steps to translate its middle power potentials into reality. 
Nigeria in alliance with other sub - regional states who resent the influence of France, should 
strive to develop a technological base which will have the effect of producing a self reliant 
economy whiles at the same time serving as growth centres for the rest of the sub - region. This 
may serve as an alternative to the over reliance on France.( Ate, 1983). 
Ali Mazrui also suggests that there is the need,~specially Nigeria which resents the French 
influence, to accelerate efforts at " re Mricanizing" Francophone West Mrica, in order for it 
to develop a more introverted sense of its existence and needs ( Mazrui in Ate 1983). To some 
extent it could be stated that ECOW AS, though primarily an economic-organization is already 
doing that. Through its purpose and functions gleaned from its constitutive document, it serves 
as a vehicle for cultural penetration; it is promoting the spirit of collective self - reliance and 
forging a regional identity. It is hoped that this process will proceed at a quicker pace, especially 
\ 
by bringing the process of economic integration to its logical conclusion. For when ~onomies 
are effectively tied up to each other it fosters a sense of shared destiny. 
The efforts to bring Francophone West Mrica back to the West Mrican family of nations could 
be given a boost through the provision of a viable alternative regional security arrangement to 
effectively replace that set up by France. It is in this direction that the ECOMOG concept need 
to be taken seriously. An allied armed force ready to intervene in trouble areas to maintain 
peace and stability in the sub - region is indeed a laudable concept. It is gratifying to note that 
at a conference in Banjul 1998 the Francophones accepted, at least in principle, to accept the 
new security mechanism that ECOMOG provides (Sessay, 1999). 
There has also been a suggestion that Nigeria and other regional actors should by way of policy 
make a persistent bold declaration rejecting the exercise of neo - colonial hegemony by extra 
- regional powers in West Africa. Apparently the intended target is France. It is believed that 
if such a doctrine is adopted and pursued vigorously it may in time acquire a moral force of its 
own, which will serve as a restraint on the behaviour of France in the affairs of the sub - region 
( Ate, 1983:28). 
The Liberian saga revealed the suspicions, mistrusts and rivalry that exist among major regional 
actors. It showed the suspicions the Francophone states, especially Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina 
Faso about the real intentions of the major contributing states, especially Nigeria. In an 
environment where there are deep suspicions about the hegemonistic intentions of Nigeria, 
whenever it initiates any course of action on the sub - region, it raises an " eye brow" especially 
from the Francophone bloc. 
ECOMOG has revealed in no uncertain terms, Nigeria's willingness and capacity to lead in the 
affairs of the sub - region. This role shows a desire to see a sub -,region free of political 
instability, to ensure an atmosphere conducive for development. She was consistent in her 
participation in the quest to solve the Liberian conflict. This is not meant to. down - play the 
role played by other states. But it is undisputable that she made more sacrifices in terms of 
, 
funding, contribution of troops, commitment and resolve. It has been reported that the war in 
J 
Liberia cost her four billion dollars and the loss of 400 Nigerian lives (Howe and Urell, 1998). 
The unparellel commitment of Nigeria in Liberia, the unilateral decisions it took in the course 
of the affairs earned her the charge that Babangida had a ' hidden agenda". For example, the 
first ECOMOG Force Commander, Arnold Quainoo, a Ghanaian, was unilaterally removed 
from his position by the Nigerians. It was Nigeria which changed the mandate of the force from 
peace - keeping to peace - enforcement; apart from Quainoo, all subsequent Force 
Commanders were Nigerians ( Sessay, 1999). 
Such unilateral measures obviously run against the unanimity which is needed in any decision 
- taking environment. Nigeria obviously is set to continue in the path it has curved for itself on 
the sub - continent, a leader in the sub - continent's affairs. However, it must seek do do so 
without leaving doubts about her altruistic intentions. Depending on the degree of sensitivity 
of the issue at stake, there is the need for proper consultation on the regional level, a need for 
conscious effort to secure the cooperation of at least the major regional actors, a need also for 
Nigeria and the other major actors to find a desirable balance between national interest and sub 
- regional interest. 
It is also recommended that with regard to issues that bring out irreconcilable differences and 
interests, decision - takers should not hesitate to bring into the process external actors picked 
on the basis of their impartiality, authority, influence and expertise. Decisional units, on any 
given issue, should be composed of actors selected on the basis of their knowledge, expertise, 
experience, negotiating skills and sufficient degree of independent - mindedness to ensure 
among other things that there will be a fair diversity of advocacies and that what is finally 
chosen is based on compromise. 
Specific Propositions 
It is imperative, in the light of the rumpus which surrounded the establishment of ECOMOG 
~ 
and its operational problems, especially at the beginning, for ECOW AS community members 
,I 
to redouble efforts to complete the process of putting in place the institutions and the 
administrative structures enshrined in the Protocol of Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD). 
The protocol provides, inter alia, that any armed threat or aggression directed against any 
member state shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire community. In the event 
of such a scenario arising it stipulates that an assistance will be given to the member state 
through an Allied Armed Forces composed of units from member states. 
It stipulates that if an internal conflict within a member state is actively engineered and 
sustained by external actors, which may endanger regional security of the whole community, 
then the ECOW AS Authority in union with the member state concern will consider the matter 
and decide on the appropriate course of action. The protocol provides for the establishment of 
an Allied Armed Force and a mediation committee of Foreign ministers and Defence Ministers 
who will liaise with the ECOW AS Authority in conflict mediation. Institutional mechanisms 
and administrative arrangements were established under the protocol. It provides that a 
collection of ECOW AS member states armies would constitute an Allied Armed Force of the 
community under a joint command. It provides that ministers of defence and foreign affairs 
shall constitute a Defence Council, whiles Chiefs of Staff would form a Defence Commission. 
The authority alone retains the right to decide on the appropriate course of action. For example, 
the protocol provides that if a member state requests for the community's assistance in the event 
of an aggression from non member state, the Authority will meet to decide on the expediency 
for military action and entrust subsequent enforcement to the Force Commander. In case of 
conflict between member states the Authority will deploy the Allied Force as a Peace - keeping 
force, but when the conflict is actively sustainedJrom outside it will respond in the same way 
as it will in the event of external aggression. In essence, the protocol provides that the Authority 
be aided in its decision by the Council. 
However, this decisional making process could be augmented by administrative structures. In 
this regard, I find the recommendations of Williams ( 1993) very useful. He recommends the 
establishment of an ECOW AS Security and Mediation Commission. It should constitute a 
\ 
permanent department at the ECOW AS Secretariat. This department should have two divisions, 
,I 
namely, the Information ,Mediation and Relief Division headed by an experience civilian with 
much expertise in mediation and international peace - keeping, and Operations, Plans and 
Logistics division to be headed by a military general who is in active service and has a wealth 
of experience in military and peace - keeping. It is the suggestion of this writer that among 
some of the functions of this department must be the gathering of information with regard to 
the operational milieu of any area of intended operation. In this regard it should have the 
expertise, know how and the resources to gather and analyse data; it must be able to provide 
expert advice on mediation. Such vital information should then be passed on to the Committee 
for Mediation and Security (CMS). It must be noted that such ~ body was recommellded during 
an extra - ordinary Summit of the Authority which was held in Lome, Togo in December 1997. 
Membership to this body is rotational. It is a nine member committee, which comprises heads 
of state, ministers of foreign affairs and ambassadors ( Anning, 1999: 1). 
The Operational Plans and Logistics Division shall have, among its tasks, the drawing up of 
blue print for operations as well as the logistical back up for it. This may then also be passed 
on to the Committee. It is recommended that the final decision for any course of action should 
be the prerogative of the full session of the ECOW AS Authority. Again, it is recommended that 
the ESMC shall maintain close contact with an intervention force and in close consultation with 
the political leaders, provide the necessary political decisions and direction to the force on the 
ground. This will forestall the situation where the force, as was the case with ECOMOG, in 
addition to its normal military functions or peace - keeping duties will have to take other 
decisions which are outside its mandate. 
One of the things that largely affected the operational performance of ECOMOG was the ad -
hoc nature of the force., it was quickly assembled for peace - keeping duties. Most of the 
soldiers who made up the force had little or no combat experience or peace - keeping training. 
Besides, the contingents came from different military background ill terms of training and 
doctrine, strategy of operation and different linguistic backgrounds, all these created problems 
of command, control and lack of cohesion. This, as has been pointed out earlier affected the 
operational performance of the force, especially at the beginning. 
I 
It is therefore recommended that the envisioned Allied Armed Force which will be given 
operational task in case of decision to intervene in a crisis area must be a force with a standard 
operating procedure. How could this be ensured ? I concur with the suggestion of Williams 
(1993) that each would be contributing state should have a stand - by unit trained especially for 
peace - keeping operations, capable of being deplored with a maximum notice of 48 hours. 
With this in place, there could be joint military exercises periodically. It will serve to build the 
necessary standardization in the event of an operation. The force so constituted should be under 
a single force commander cho§en on the basis of his experience and peace - keeping credentials. 
It is further recommended that the force commander and those at the top of the chain of 
command should be bilingual. They should have effective command over both English and 
French. This would make for effective communication and ensure efficient implementation of 
task. The experience with the Guinean Battalion makes such requirement necessary. 
Organizational " health" depends on adequate logistical back up. It has been identified that 
ECOMOG had problems with logistical control. At the time of the operation it was 
recommended that each contributing state should provide for the logistical needs of its troops. 
As a result of this, there came to be established two command structures. Logistically, 
ECOMOG was under the command of different troops while operationally under the command 
of ECOMOG. This anomaly obviously affected command and control mechanism of the 
operation . As was the case with the Ghanaian contingent who had the facility and enough 
supply of medication to carry out surgery operations. It was reported that contrary to operational 
policy which recommended that such resources should be pooled and placed under a single 
command for the benefits of all the troops, that battalion refused and only catered for wounded 
Ghanaian soldiers. It is suggested that member ~tates should marshal the necessary political 
goodwill to make the necessary financial sacrifices so that adequate and requisite logistical back 
up could be secured for any peace - keeping mission. 
Iweze ( 1993) complained that the personnel chosen for the logistical cell of the operation were 
not chosen on the basis of their experience in logistics. They were chosen on the grounds of 
political expediency, in fact, to reflect the principle of equitable participation by the 
\ 
contributing countries. It is recommended that in any future operations it should be the task of 
J 
the Plans, Operation and Logistics arm of ESMC to ensure that the appropriate personnel with 
the requisite skills and experience are selected for the logistics cell of the operation. 
It was reported that in line with the recommendation for contributing countries to'provide their 
own logistical needs, contributing countries which brought along their own communication 
systems preferred to use them for communication purposes rather than those recommended by 
the general command. One possible reason for this, may have been their familiarity with their 
own systems. To forestall tI:~ occurrence of such a scenario in future, it is suggested that a 
unifonn set of communication systems be adopted, and that selected personnel should be trained 
on how to man them. 
Organizations are important links in any decision - making and implementation process. Their 
ability to contribute effectively to the entire decisional process depend hugely on the existence 
of Standard Operating Procedure, requisite manpower and logistics; it is therefore in the 
acknowledgement of this that the above recommendations have been made. 
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Appendices: Table 1.1 Composition of ECOMOG as at 27 August 1990: 
Country: 
Gambia 
Guinea 
Ghana 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
Troop Strength 
A Riffle Company ( Coy) 
A Battalion 
A Battalion 
A Battalion 
A Battalion 
The naval and Air Force personnel was drawn from Ghana and Nigeria. The Ghana Navy 
contributed three naval vessels, namely: 1. A Fighting Patrol Graft 
2 . A Naval ship 
3. A Merchant ship 
The Nigerian Navy contributed five vessels, namely: 
1. A Landing Ship Tank. 
2. Two Fighting Patrol Graft 
3. A Tug Boat. 
4. An Oil Tanker. 
Source: (Iweze, 1993: 220) 
Table 1.2 Composition of ECOMOG as at February 1993: 
,I 
Country Troop Strena:th National Total 
Gambia 150 900 
Ghana 1,500 11,900 
Guinea 600 9,700 
Mali 6 7,300 
Nigeria 9,000 94,500 
Sierra Leone 700 3,150 
Total 11,256 146,350 
Senegal had withdrawn its 1600 troops at this time. 
Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1991 - 1992 ( London: IISS, 1991): 136 - 7; and West 
Africa (23 - 9 November 1992): 2008 - 11. 
Table 1.3 The Armed Factions in the Liberian Conflict 
Faction Troop Strength 
The Independent National Pat:1iotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) 500 
The National pattiotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) 25,000 
United Liberation Movement for Democracy ( ULIMO- K) 2,000 
- (ULIMO -1) 8,000 
Armed Forces of Liberia ( AFL) 9,000 
Liberian Peace Council ( LPC) 4,500 
LOFA Defence Force (LDF) 750 
Source: Accord website : http://accordlactors:htm. 
Table 1.4 The Composition of ECOMOG as at 1995: 
Total 8,430 
Source: United Nations Department of Public Information. Publication on 4 July 1997 at 
UN website: www.un.org.DeptsIDPICD/missions!unomil - bhtm. 
Table 1.5: The Gross Domestic Product of the Various ECOWAS Member States as at 
1996: 
Country: GDP 
Benin 1,522m 
Cote d'Ivoire 6,716m 
Gambia 36}m 
Burkina Faso 1,856m 
Cape Verde 334m 
Guinea 3,395 
Guinea Bissau 243m 
Ghana 5,421m 
Mali 1,871m 
Niger 1,540m 
! 
Nigeria 35,200m 
Mauritania 1,027m 
Liberia 2,800m 
Senegal 3,881m 
Sierra Leone 843m 
Togo 981m 
Source: Africa Confidential (3 January, 1997) Vol. 38, No.1 p.2. 
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